Category:

USCIS Finalizes Unlawful Presence Policy Putting F, J And M Nonimmigrants In Great Jeopardy

8/13/2018

By: Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer
The Insightful Immigration Blog

The USCIS finalized its unlawful presence policy for F, J and M nonimmigrants on August 9, 2018. The final policy makes no significant changes from the draft policy of May 10, 2018. My earlier blog noted the flaws in the draft policy, which persist in the final policy. The final policy incorrectly breaks down the distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the US. As of August 9, 2018, F, J and M nonimmigrants who have failed to maintain nonimmigrant status will start accruing unlawful presence.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II). Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

Prior to August 9, 2018, foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

This will no longer be the case. Under the new policy effective August 9, 2018, any status violation will start the accrual of unlawful presence. The nonimmigrant will not be provided with any formal notice of a status violation, and any violation from the past that has been discovered would have already started the accrual of unlawful presence. According to the policy memo, the USCIS officer should consider information relating to the alien’s immigration history, including but not limited to:

Information contained in the systems available to USCIS;
Information contained in the alien’s record; and
Information obtained through a Request for Evidence (RFE) or Notice of Intent to Deny, if any.

The final policy purports to make one concession from the draft policy, which is that if a nonimmigrant in F, J or M nonimmigrant classification makes a timely filing for reinstatement of status, then unlawful presence will not accrue during the pendency of this request. In the case of students in F-1 status, a reinstatement application will be considered timely filed if the applicant has not been out of status for more than 5 months at the time of filing for a request for reinstatement under 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(16). If the reinstatement request is approved, then the period of time an F-1 nonimmigrant was out of status prior to filing the application, along with the period of time during the pendency of the request, will not be counted as unlawful presence. If the reinstatement application is denied, the accrual of unlawful presence resumes on the day after the denial. Whether or not the application for reinstatement is timely filed, USCIS said, an F, J, or M nonimmigrant “whose application for reinstatement is ultimately approved will generally not accrue unlawful presence while out of status.”

USCIS also noted that the Department of State (DOS) administers the J-1 exchange visitor program, to include reinstatement requests. If DOS approves the reinstatement application of a J nonimmigrant, “the individual will generally not accrue unlawful presence from the time the J nonimmigrant fell out of status from the time he or she was reinstated,” USCIS said.

Unfortunately, most students may never know that they fell out of status until it is too late and they may never have an opportunity to file for reinstatement. Students will also likely be found to have violated status if they pursued practical training that is perceived as not being consistent with the regulations.

Esteemed colleague and immigration law expert Stephen Yale-Loehr has compiled a list of 50 examples how an international student might inadvertently or unknowingly fall out of status and start to accrue unlawful presence under the new guidance. Many of these examples arise from mistakes by the school. For instance, a designated school officer (DSO) may mistakenly complete a record, which will indicate to a USCIS officer that the student has remained in the United States beyond the end date of the program, and may have also worked on campus in violation of F-1 status. Status violations can also result from inadvertent miscommunications between school officials. An undergraduate student receives permission from an academic advisor (but not the DSO) to drop a course. The student is now registered for 11 rather than 12 semester credit hours. Later, the USCIS deems her to be in violation of status and accruing unlawful presence.

The USCIS has already begun to lay traps in order to nab students who may have unwittingly violated status. Recent RFEs issued after the filing of a change of status request from F-1 to H-1B require a student to meticulously demonstrate that he or she maintained status during post-completion practical training, including proving that the student was not unemployed for more than the requisite amount of time. The student must also prove that the employment, including an unpaid internship, was related to the major field of study. Here is one example inquiring whether a student maintained status during a routine period of optional practical training:

F-1 OPT: Students engaging in initial F-1 post-completion Optional Practical Training (OPT) may not accrue an aggregate of more than 90 days off unemployment during the initial post-completion OPT period. Students granted the 17-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 120 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 17-month OPT extension. Students granted the 24-month OPT extension may not accrue an aggregate of more than 150 days of unemployment during the total OPT period including any initial OPT and the 24-month OPT extension. Further, students engaging in F-1 post-completion must engage in at least 20 hours or more per week of employment that is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study. Lastly, unpaid internships may meet the OPT employment requirements if the internship is directly related to the student’s U.S. major of study and the internship complies with all labor laws. Please provide evidence that the beneficiary maintained the beneficiary’s F-1 status during post-completion OPT. Evidence may include but is not limited to the following:

-A list of all employers the beneficiary has worked for under post-completion OPT and the periods the beneficiary worked for those employers;

-Copies of all pay records/stubs for the beneficiary from the starting date of post-completion OPT to the present time; and

-Evidence that the beneficiary worked at least 20 hours or more per week in a position is directly related to the beneficiary’s U.S. major of study.

Similarly, maintaining status through Curricular Practical Training (CPT) is frequently challenged in RFEs by asking for evidence that the CPT was an integral part of the beneficiary’s degree program. The regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(1)(i) leaves undefined “curricular practical training program that is an integral part of an established curriculum” thus leaving it open for a subjective interpretation. Also, where the CPT commenced immediately upon the student’s enrolment in the program, the USCIS questions whether immediate participation in CPT was required for the beneficiary’s studies.

A student can also be found to have violated status due to an ambiguity in the rules providing for the maximum amount of time in practical training. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) provides that a student may be authorized a total of 12 months of practical training, and becomes eligible for another 12 months when the student changes to a higher educational level. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) further provides that “students who have received one year or more of full time curricular practical training are ineligible for post-completion academic training.” This could be interpreted to mean that a student can receive more than one year of CPT, and such CPT is routinely granted by DSOs through the SEVIS system that is administered by ICE. But USCIS is now interpreting this to mean that the total time that a student is entitled in any sort of practical training is 12 months even though ICE, its sister agency, authorized more than 12 months of CPT. USCIS is disregarding the suggestion in 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) that a student may be entitled to more than 12 months of CPT.

Upon receiving such an RFE, it is important to submit evidence to overcome USCIS’s doubts. Still, it may be difficult to challenge USCIS’s interpretation that the regulation at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10) only authorizes a total of 12 months of practical training, even though 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(i) appears to suggest that CPT can be granted in excess of 1 year. It may also be difficult to demonstrate to the USCIS’s satisfaction that the CPT was an integral part of an established curriculum. If the request for a change of status is not granted, the F-1 nonimmigrant would have started accruing unlawful presence as of August 9, 2018. In the event of the student departing later than February 5, 2020, he or she will be barred from entering the US for 3 years. After February 5, 2020, there will be no such grace period, and prior status violations that were in excess of 180 days will result in 3 year or 10 year bars to reentry upon the student departing the United States. The student may not be able to change or adjust status in the United States, and thus will be caught in a federally imposed Catch-22 situation.

The unlawful presence policy compounds the plight of the nonimmigrant who may also receive a Notice to Appear and be placed in removal proceedings under yet another USCIS policy designed to make life more difficult for law abiding nonimmigrants. Some are deciding to withdraw the request for change of status, upon receiving difficult to overcome RFEs, and leave the United States, prior to February 5, 2020, so that they can process their H-1B visas at a US consulate abroad. While such a strategy may allow the applicant to escape being issued a Notice to Appear, it could cause issues at the US consulate where a consul may still want the applicant to justify whether the CPT program was bona fide. On the other hand, if the applicant is placed in removal proceedings, and if voluntary departure is issued by an Immigration Judge prior to the accrual of unlawful presence of one year or more, then there is an escape hatch pursuant to INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). The 3 year bar does not apply to those who departed after the commencement of proceedings and before the accrual of 1 year of unlawful presence (as there is explicit language to this effect in the provision). If the voluntary departure order is issued after 1 year of unlawful presence, then the ten-year bar would trigger under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) would apply. There is no escape hatch to the 10 year bar as there is to the 3 year bar whilst in removal proceedings. Further ethical and strategic considerations regarding representing beneficiaries of denied requests in removal proceedings can be found in my blog here.

The final policy will not just cause havoc to nonimmigrants snared with technical or perceived violations of status, but schools will also face liability for errors by DSOs. Challenging the policy in federal court is indeed the need of the hour, and there is an urgent need for universities, hospitals and research institutions to come forward as plaintiffs! The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar under INA § 212(a)(9)C), are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“…an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.”

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present, and thus violates INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(ii). If the USCIS wanted to so radically change its prior interpretation of unlawful presence for F, J and M nonimmigrants, it ought to have promulgated a rule through a more formal notice and comment under the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the policy violates the due process rights of these nonimmigrants as it imposes draconian penalties, 3 and 10 year bars, for status violations for which they never received formal warning and notice. All these are ripe grounds, among many others, for a successful challenge to this flawed policy in federal court!

0 Comments

USCIS Improperly Blurs Distinction Between Violation of Status and Unlawful Presence for F, J and M Nonimmigrants

5/12/2018

0 Comments

By: Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer
The Insightful Immigration Blog

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a policy memorandum on May 10, 2018, “Accrual of Unlawful Presence and F, J, and M Nonimmigrants.” The memo abruptly revises previous policy guidance in the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual relating to this issue. The new guidance is effective August 9, 2018, and after reading this blog, it is hoped that readers are sufficiently shocked and motivated to submit comments as the radical departure from previous policy will jeopardize the ability of many nonimmigrants, mainly foreign students, from returning to the United States for unwitting or inadvertent status violations.

There has always been a strict distinction between violating status and being unlawfully present in the United States. One can be in violation of status without being unlawfully present. Even if an F, J and M student dropped out of school or engaged in unauthorized work, he or she would be considered to have been in violation of status but not accruing unlawful presence. This is because an F, M and J nonimmigrant is usually admitted for a Duration of Status (D/S) rather than up to a certain date. An F, M or J can maintain status so long as they remain enrolled in the educational institution or participate in activities pursuant to that status, which is why they are admitted under D/S. On the other hand, one who is the beneficiary of an approved H-1B or L nonimmigrant petition is admitted only up to the validity date of the petition. F, M and J nonimmigrants are not beneficiaries of prior approved petitions filed by sponsors.

The new policy states various ways in which F, J, and M nonimmigrants and their dependents begin accruing unlawful presence. For example, F, J, and M nonimmigrants who failed to maintain nonimmigrant status before August 9, 2018, will start accruing unlawful presence based on that failure on August 9, 2018, unless the nonimmigrant had already started accruing unlawful presence based on several scenarios under the prior policy discussed below.

Individuals who have accrued more than 180 days of unlawful presence during a single stay, and then depart, may be subject to 3-year or 10-year bars to admission, depending on how much unlawful presence they accrued before they departed the United States. See INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) & (II). Individuals who have accrued a total period of more than one year of unlawful presence, whether in a single stay or during multiple stays in the United States, and who then reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being admitted or paroled, are permanently inadmissible. See INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(1).

The new policy supersedes existing policy, which is that foreign students (F nonimmigrants) and exchange visitors (J nonimmigrants) who were admitted for, or present in the United States in, Duration of Status started accruing unlawful presence on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigrant benefit or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first. F and J nonimmigrants, and foreign vocational students (M nonimmigrants), who were admitted until a specific date certain accrued unlawful presence on the day after their Form I-94 expired, on the day after USCIS formally found a nonimmigrant status violation while adjudicating a request for another immigration benefit, or on the day after an immigration judge ordered the applicant excluded, deported, or removed (whether or not the decision was appealed), whichever came first.

By contrast, one admitted under an approved H-1B or L visa petition up to a certain date starts accruing unlawful presence after remaining beyond that date while a student who was admitted under D/S did not unless there was a violation of status finding by the USCIS or by an immigration judge. This holds true even with respect to a nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain visa. If the H-1B or L nonimmigrant violates status during the validity period of the admission, he or she will be in violation of status but will not accrue unlawful presence unless there is a formal finding by the USICS or an immigration judge.

The prior policy made more sense, and maintained the important distinction between maintenance of status and lawful or unlawful presence. The 3 and 10 year bars, or the permanent bar, are extremely draconian and should only be triggered when the nonimmigrant goes beyond a date certain expiration date. This is consistent with the statutory definition of unlawful presence under 212(a)(9)(B)(ii), which provides:

“….an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United States without being admitted or paroled”

The new policy blurs the difference between being out of status and unlawfully present. Unlawful presence ought to only trigger when one goes beyond an expiration date and not when there is a contestable violation of status. If a student in F status is in violation of that status, he or she can be placed in removal proceeding and may contest the allegation in the proceeding. If the Immigration Judge orders the person removed based on the violation, then the unlawful presence period may commence upon the order. Similarly, when one who is in F status applies for a change of status, and the USCIS finds that the applicant violated status, which the applicant may have been able to contest, unlawful presence may commence after such a finding.

Under the new policy, a nonimmigrant in F, J or M status may have unwittingly violated that status by not pursuing a full course of study or engaging in an unauthorized activity, and may never get notice of it until much later. Even F-1 students in post-completion practical training could potentially be deemed later to have engaged in unauthorized activity, such as not working in an area consistent with their field of study or a STEM trainee being placed at a third party client site, which USCIS has without notice abruptly disfavored, or if a school’s curricular practical training does not meet the USCIS’s subjective interpretation of whether the school was in compliance when it authorized such training. In the meantime, this person would have started accruing unlawful presence and triggered the 10 year bar to reentry upon departing the United States. The dependent spouse would also unfairly accrue unlawful presence as a result of a status violation by the principal spouse. This individual may never get a chance to contest the violation of status after the fact. Unlawful presence should only trigger when there is clear notice of remaining beyond an expiration date of authorized stay in the United States and not when there is a contestable allegation of violation of status. An F, J or M nonimmigrant is now in a worse off position than say an H-1B nonimmigrant admitted under a date certain validity period. A violation of status by the H-1B nonimmigrant during the period of authorized stay would not trigger unlawful presence. Even after 9/11, when immigration policies concerning students were tightened, we did not see such a cynical change in policy for students as now under the Trump administration where they may not know in time of a status violation only to later realize they have unwittingly accrued unlawful presence triggering the 10 year bar.

This is my preliminary reaction to the new unlawful presence policy relating to F, M and J nonimmigrants. There will be many other good arguments that will be developed and interested persons, along with those who will be potentially affected by 3 and 10 year bars, are strongly urged to send in comments before June 11, 2019. The memo will take effect on August 9, 2018, but the abrupt change in policy without any proper rationale or justification also potentially makes it ripe for litigation.

0 Comments

The Immigration-Abandonment Ploy -- Fallout from a Fiddling Congress and Bickering Allies

11/11/2013

0 Comments

Angelo Paparelli, ABIL Immediate Past President
Nation of Immigrators

The times they are a-mournin' for proponents of immigrant rights and immigration reform. While Pope Francis shows the world how to love by embracing and praying with a tumor-scarred man, immigrants-rights activists and immigration-reform pragmatists are at war among themselves over tactics in the battle to achieve just solutions to our nation's dysfunctional immigration problems. They who should be allies hurl vitriol and worse at one another, as Republicans in the House and outside the chamber say that even piecemeal solutions won't occur before the current session ends, but may surface in 14 months. Meanwhile, as the House fiddles and change-agents fuss, the "Great Chopper" that is America's immigration bureaucracy continues to disaggregate lives, businesses and dreams, turning them into mourning mush. No, I'm not talking about the immigration-prison/deportation industrial complex which whirs at grotesquely efficient and fevered speeds -- that topic is grist for another post.

Rather, today's blog riffs on the theme of immigration inanity played out in my last post and in several others ("Immigration Good Behavior -- a Riddle Riddled with Riddles," "Immigration Absurdity: You Can Work Here But You Can't Be Here," and "Immigration Indifference - The Adjudicator's Curse").

Today's asininity is all about abandonment, an immigration-agency notion confected, mostly without stakeholder input, by work-shirking bureaucrats rather than through the orderly, judicially-envisioned modus operandi of enacted legislation and promulgated regulations.

Immigration abandonment holds that a foreign entrant who applies to extend or change nonimmigrant visa status in the U.S., and who has paid almost 300 bucks in filing fees just to make the ask, will not receive a decision on the merits but instead be peremptorily denied if s/he leaves the U.S. before an often dilatory adjudicator gets around to considering the application.

Immigration abandonment also plays out in the process of applying for a green card. Although the latter form of short-changing is moistened with the sprinkled holy water of an actual agency regulation (8 CFR § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(D)), an adjustment of status applicant -- like his nonimmigrant cousin -- is still treated as having relinquished the desire to become a permanent resident if s/he leaves the U.S., however temporarily, without special dispensation, notwithstanding that the departing individual has no desire to forswear permanent residence and despite the payment of up to $2,070 in application fees.

In the case of the green card applicant, immigration abandonment can lead -- at best -- to delay and squandered filing fees, and -- at worst -- to ineligibility. The immigrant visa quota may have closed or retrogressed in the interim, thereby precluding immediate reapplication for adjustment of status. Or, the factual basis or legal grounds to adjust status may no longer exist; the American Dream of permanent U.S. residence and ultimately citizenship thus evaporating into the ether created by work-avoidant immigration officials.

The consequences may be equally or more tragic in the nonimmigrant context whenever a temporary entrant seeks to extend/change visa status in the United States but needs to depart the U.S. while the application is pending. To understand why, the reader must first consider the supposed rationale and contorted logic served up by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in this typical formulation:

The astute reader will have noted some whopping non sequiturs in the USCIS's explanation. Submission of either a timely request to extend/change status or an untimely request caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond the applicant's control (as permitted by regulation) is a reflection of behavior demonstrating a desire and intent to play by, rather than flout, the rules. Moreover, departing the U.S. need not necessarily be construed as a failure to maintain the "previously accorded nonimmigrant status." It may signify nothing more or less than a departure from the country. What the USCIS's immigration-abandonment ploy really reveals is an agency's acceptance of money under false pretenses in return for a promised service (the adjudication of a request for an immigration benefit) that is never delivered. Some would call that fraud. It is worse than fraud, however, because it also involves a waste of government resources and the utter disregard of a very relevant statute.

The statute is Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(iv) [8 U.S. Code §1182(a)(9)(B)(iv)]. This law allows a law-abiding foreign citizen to avoid temporarily the imposition of the penalties of visa voidance and the three- and ten-year bars to reentry for his or her "unlawful presence (UP)" in the United States.

UP arises when an individual stays in the country longer than officially permitted, as specified in a government document containing a date-certain deadline imposed by the Attorney General or his statutory successor, the Secretary of Homeland Security. This statutory postponement or "tolling" of any period of UP is allowed in the following situation:

Tolling for good cause.--

In the case of an alien who--

has been lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States,

has filed a nonfrivolous application for a change or extension of status before the date of expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General [or Secretary of Homeland Security], and

has not been employed without authorization in the United States before or during the pendency of such application,

[then] the calculation of the period of [UP] time specified . . . shall be tolled during the pendency of such application, but not to exceed 120 days.

When USCIS takes money without providing a decision on the merits of the change or extension of status application, then a consular officer deciding whether to issue or refuse a nonimmigrant or immigrant visa must do what the USCIS adjudicator failed to do. The consular officer must determine whether the change/extension of status application was in fact "nonfrivolous" in order for UP to be tolled.

The failure of one officer to do his or her duty thus engenders government waste when another officer in a different department must deploy scarce resources and review the application (for no additional fee). Had the USCIS not relied on the immigration-abandonment notion as a way to shirk work, and had the adjudicator approved the application, the approval would essentially confirm that the application to extend or change status was indeed "nonfrivolous," as that term is defined:

To be considered nonfrivolous, the application must have an arguable basis in law and fact and must not have been filed for an improper purpose (e.g., as a groundless excuse for the applicant to remain in the U.S. to engage in activities incompatible with his/her status). To find an application nonfrivolous, it is not necessary to determine that the INS [USCIS] would have ultimately ruled in favor of the alien.

9 Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual § 40.92 N5 “Tolling” for Good Cause

* * *

So, no matter whether Congress dithers and dallies, and reformers on the left bicker and bite, the USCIS -- the adjudicative arm of the Great Chopper -- must be retooled. The agency must do its job and decide applications for which fees have been fully paid on their merits. USCIS must abandon immigration abandonment.

0 Comments

Waiving Goodbye to Unappealable Decisions: Indirect AAO Jurisdiction, or Why Having Your Appeal Dismissed Can Sometimes Be a Good Thing

8/5/2013

0 Comments

by David Isaacson, Associate with ABIL member, Cyrus D. Mehta
The Insightful Immigration Blog

The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, or AAO, has administrative appellate jurisdiction over a wide variety of USCIS decisions that are not appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals. This jurisdiction is primarily set forth in a regulatory list that has been absent from the Code of Federal Regulations since 2003, but was incorporated by reference that year into DHS Delegation 0150.1. Pursuant to that delegation, as many AAO decisions state, the AAO exercises appellate jurisdiction over the matters described at 8 C.F.R. 103.1(f)(3)(iii) as in effect on February 28, 2003. (It has been previously pointed out by attorney Matt Cameron that a currently nonexistent jurisdictional regulation is an undesirable state of affairs for an appellate body; USCIS recently indicated in a July 2013 Policy Memorandum regarding certification of decisions that DHS intends to replace the list in the regulations in a future rulemaking.)

The regulatory list of applications over which the AAO has jurisdiction does not include Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status, with a minor exception relating to applications based on a marriage entered into during removal proceedings denied for failure to meet the bona fide marriage exemption under INA §245(e). Thus, it would appear that the AAO would not have appellate jurisdiction over denials of adjustment applications, and that one’s sole administrative recourse if an adjustment application is denied would be to seek review before an immigration judge in removal proceedings, as is generally permitted (except for certain arriving aliens) by 8 C.F.R. §1245.2(a)(5)(ii). But appearances can be deceiving.

Many, although not all, of the grounds for denial of an adjustment application are potentially subject to waiver under appropriate conditions. If an application is denied because the applicant was found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i) due to conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), for example, a waiver can be sought under INA §212(h) if either the criminal conduct took place more than 15 years ago, or the applicant can attempt to demonstrate that the applicant’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, son or daughter would face extreme hardship if the applicant were not admitted. Similarly, one who is found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(C)(i) due to fraud or willful misrepresentation (not involving a false claim to U.S. citizenship taking place after September 30, 1996) can seek a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(i) based on extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent. Various other grounds of inadmissibility are waiveable as well.

While the AAO does not have jurisdiction directly over the denial of an adjustment application, the AAO does have jurisdiction over the denial of most waiver applications. And in the AAO’s view, appellate jurisdiction to determine whether someone should have been granted a waiver necessarily includes jurisdiction to decide whether that applicant even needed a waiver in the first place. If the AAO finds that a waiver was unnecessary, it will dismiss the waiver appeal and remand for further processing of the adjustment application. That is, it will decide on appeal that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible, and thus in effect will have reviewed the denial of the underlying adjustment application even without regard to whether a waiver would be justified if one were indeed necessary. Although this process does not appear to be documented in any precedential AAO decision, comparatively few AAO precedent decisions of any sort having been published, this exercise of indirect appellate jurisdiction by the AAO occurs with some frequency in non-precedential, “unpublished” decisions that have been made available online (generally by USCIS itself, or occasionally by other sources).

Dismissal of a waiver appeal as moot can occur in the context of a §212(h) waiver, for example, where the AAO finds that the applicant’s conviction was not for a CIMT (see also these additional decisions from 2012; 2010; February, March, April and June of 2009; 2008; and 2007). Even if the applicant does have a CIMT conviction, that AAO may conclude that the applicant’s only conviction for a CIMT qualifies for the petty offense exception under INA §212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and thus does not give rise to inadmissibility (see also these decisions along the same lines from January and March of 2009, 2008, and 2006). Dismissal of a §212(h) waiver application as moot can also occur when the AAO finds that the applicant was not convicted of a crime at all given that the official disposition of a charge was a “Nolle prosequi”, or that an applicant who was not convicted of a crime had not given a valid admission to the elements of a crime, in accordance with the procedural safeguards required by precedent, so as to give rise to inadmissibility in the absence of a conviction. Outside the CIMT context, as well, the AAO can dismiss a §212(h) waiver appeal as moot upon a finding that no waiver is needed, such as when someone who was thought to have a waiveable conviction involving 30 grams or less of marijuana successfully points out on appeal that disorderly conduct under a statute not mentioning drugs is not an offense relating to a controlled substance.

In the context of a denial based on inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation, the AAO can dismiss an appeal from the denial of a §212(i) waiver as moot if it finds that the misrepresentation was not material (see also these decisions from 2010, 2009 and 2007), or that an applicant who was victimized by others submitting a fraudulent application on his behalf without his knowledge did not make a willful misrepresentation, or that any misrepresentation was the subject of a timely retraction (see also this decision from 2006). AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can also be used to vindicate the legal principle that presenting a false Form I-94 or similar false documentation to an employer to obtain employment does not give rise to inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i), and neither does procuring false immigration documentation from a private individual more generally, because a misrepresentation under 212(a)(6)(C)(i) must be made to an authorized U.S. government official. Finally, AAO dismissal of a §212(i) waiver appeal as moot can occur where the only alleged misrepresentation occurred in the context of a legalization program which is subject to statutory confidentiality protection, such as the SAW (Special Agricultural Worker) program under INA §210 or a LULAC late legalization application or other application under INA §245A, and therefore any such misrepresentation cannot be the basis of inadmissibility under §212(a)(6)(C)(i) because of the confidentiality protection.

This sort of indirect AAO jurisdiction can also be used to correct errors regarding inadmissibility for unlawful presence under INA §212(a)(9)(B), if a waiver application is filed under INA §212(a)(9)(B)(v). For example, in a 2012 decision involving an applicant who was admitted for duration of status (D/S) and had been incorrectly found to have accrued unlawful presence after failing to maintain status even absent any finding of such by USCIS or an immigration judge, contrary to the 2009 Neufeld/Scialabba/Chang USCIS consolidated guidance memorandum on unlawful presence, the AAO dismissed the appeal as moot upon finding that the applicant was not, in fact, inadmissible under §212(a)(9)(B).

The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations has even been exercised where the initial inadmissibility determination was made not by a USCIS officer in the context of an application for adjustment of status, but by a Department of State consular officer in the context of a consular application for an immigrant visa. In a 2009 decision, the AAO dismissed as moot an appeal from the denial of a §212(h) waiver by the Officer in Charge (OIC) in Manila, holding that the applicant did not require a waiver because the applicant’s admission to an examining physician that he had used marijuana in the past did not give rise to inadmissibility, and that Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a valid admission to the elements of a crime resulting in inadmissibility under similar circumstances) did not apply because the applicant and the office that made the decision were located in the Philippines rather than within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The AAO ordered “the matter returned to the OIC for further processing of the immigrant visa application.” It explained the source of its authority in this context as follows:

The Secretary of Homeland Security (and by delegation, the AAO) has final responsibility over guidance to consular officers concerning inadmissibility for visa applicants. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Secretaries of State and Homeland Security Concerning Implementation of Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, issued September 30, 2003, at 3.

Matter of X- (AAO June 17, 2009), at 4.

Nor was that Manila case an isolated exception, although the detailed explanation of the source of the AAO’s authority in the consular context that was contained in that decision is rarer that the exercise of the authority itself. The AAO has also dismissed as moot an appeal of the denial of an application for a §212(h) waiver by the Mexico City district director in the case of an applicant who sought an immigrant visa in the Dominican Republic and had been convicted of a firearms offense which would properly give rise to deportability but not inadmissibility; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Frankfurt, Germany OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant whom the AAO determined had not been convicted of a CIMT; dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Vienna, Austria OIC denying a §212(h) waiver for an applicant the AAO found had only been subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings not giving rise to a conviction for immigration purposes under Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2001); and dismissed another appeal from a decision of the Vienna OIC where the AAO found that the applicant’s conviction qualified for the petty offense exception. Indeed, the AAO has exercised its indirect appellate jurisdiction over a consular inadmissibility determination in at least one appeal from a decision of the Mexico City district director where “the applicant did not appear to contest the district director’s determination of inadmissibility” but the AAO found that neither of the crimes of which the applicant had been convicted was a CIMT. The AAO’s indirect appellate jurisdiction has also been exercised in a case coming from the New Delhi, India OIC where an applicant disputed his date of departure from the United States which started the running of the ten-year bar, and the AAO found that the applicant’s actual departure had been more than ten years prior and thus no §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was required.

Perhaps most interestingly, it appears that the AAO will even exercise its indirect appellate jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations in some cases where the applicant has failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relevant waiver, although the only examples that this author have been able to find of this involve the AAO’s indirect jurisdiction over USCIS adjustment denials rather than consular-processing of an immigrant visa. In a 2006 decision, an applicant who had not provided any evidence that his wife was a Lawful Permanent Resident who could serve as a qualifying relative for either a §212(i) waiver or a §212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver was found not to be inadmissible because he had made a timely retraction of any misrepresentation, and had accrued no unlawful presence due to last departing the United States in 1989. In a 2009 decision, an applicant who had pled guilty to hiring undocumented workers, and who had been found inadmissible under INA §212(a)(6)(E)(i) for alien smuggling and appealed the denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA §212(d)(11), was found not inadmissible by the AAO, which withdrew the district director’s contrary finding—even though the district director had found that the applicant did not meet the requirements of §212(d)(11), and seems very likely to have been right about that, since §212(d)(11) applies only to an applicant who “has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.” And in 2010, the AAO declared moot a waiver application under INA §212(g) by an individual infected with HIV who apparently had not established any relationship with a qualifying relative, on the ground that in January 2010 the Centers for Disease Control had removed HIV from the official list of communicable diseases of public health significance, and therefore HIV infection was no longer a ground of inadmissibility. Some potentially difficult ethical and practical questions would need to be resolved before deliberately filing a waiver application on behalf of an applicant ineligible for such waiver in order to obtain AAO review of whether the applicant was inadmissible at all, but it is at least a possibility worthy of further analysis.

So when an application for adjustment of status, or even for a consular-processed immigrant visa, is denied, it is important to keep in mind that an appeal may be available even if it does not appear so at first glance, and that establishing the necessary hardship to a qualifying relative to support a waiver application is not necessarily the only way to win the case. If a waiver of the ground upon which the denial was based is at least theoretically available, so as to support AAO jurisdiction over the denial of that waiver, then one can leverage the waiver to seek AAO review of whether a waiver was necessary in the first place.

0 Comments

A New Immigration Recipe: Specialty Chefs Need a Dream Act Too!

1/13/2013

0 Comments

Angelo Paparelli, ABIL Immediate Past President
Nation of Immigrators

[Blogger’s note: Today’s guest blog is by my friend and scholarly colleague, Nathan Waxman. Nathan revisits an issue he first considered eight years ago in this space when he bemoaned the increasingly poor quality of ethnically authentic food in New York City, and laid the blame upon our immigration laws. Having suffered through several more years of culinary displeasure, and at last seeing a glimmer of hope for immigration reform, Nathan now offers an analysis of the current immigration mess and an enlightened solution.]

A New Immigration Recipe: Specialty Chefs Need a Dream Act Too!
By Nathan Waxman

A guest blog by this author in April 2005 (“Is That Chipotle in My Sushi?”) reported on the adverse interplay of two laws: the 1996 enactment of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(9) and the sunsetting of INA § 245(i) in April 2001. That post noted how the rapidly proliferating small-to-medium sized, and particularly family-owned, ethnic restaurants were coping, largely unsuccessfully, with the distasteful consequences of Congress’s enactment of § 212(a)(9), the “unlawful presence” bar of up to ten years prohibiting the grant of permanent residence to most aliens who have tallied more than 12 months of unauthorized stay in the United States. To add to the dyspepsia, Congress had failed to renew a 1994 law, the temporary but vital remedy of § 245(i), which allowed qualified immigrants who had failed to maintain legal status nonetheless to obtain a green card in the U.S. through adjustment of status.

Fast forward eight years. Despite the economic doldrums, gastronomic diversity is here to stay.

Thai restaurants can be found on the remote eastern shore of Virginia, just miles from the island home of the fabled wild ponies of Assateague. Indeed, once concentrated in major urban centers, Thai and Vietnamese (especially pho) restaurants are now nearly as common as pancake houses in small-town middle America.
Taquerias increasingly outnumber diners and “greasy spoons” along the highways and byways of America, from Alabama to Oregon.
Ethiopian and other African cuisines have escaped the gravitational pull of coastal urban centers and can be found in medium-sized cities and suburbs throughout the country.
Regional Indian and Chinese food has penetrated small-town America, and fusion restaurants have burst out of the urban bubble and are thriving in smaller cities and towns throughout the country.

So who is browning the pungent Indian fenugreek and stewing the fiery Ethiopian doro wat?

In 2005, restaurant owners were already recruiting staff of heterogeneous ethnicity from the available populations of experienced work-authorized kitchen crew. However, at the time of the 2005 blog post, few foresaw that the number of people seeking third employment-based preference immigrant visas would cause a persistent retrogression of the quota and in turn would be as toxic as a poorly-filleted fugu by virtually eliminating labor certification and immigrant visa sponsorship as viable options for filling permanent positions in the ethnic restaurant industry.

Clearly, the malaise of 2005 has deteriorated into a debilitating chronic condition for small-to-midsized local restaurants serving ethnic cuisines.

Skilled advocacy, when the facts are right, can enable elite restaurants, ethnic or otherwise, to use such nonimmigrant visa categories as H-1B, E, L-1 or O-1 visas, or the EB-1 or EB-2 immigrant mechanisms, to secure the services of a rarefied stratum of culinary professionals or managers. However, the typical independently-owned ethnic restaurant, whether in the America's Heartland or in an emerging urban neighborhood, cannot ethically or practically avail itself of these more difficult nonimmigrant visas or, indeed, of equally challenging immigrant visa sponsorship these days.

The four case scenarios below show how the inadequacies of U.S. immigration law have made it increasingly difficult for small-to-medium sized ethnic restaurants to staff their kitchens with qualified workers who can please demanding restaurant patrons seeking the best in ethnic cuisines.

A pioneering authentic Thai restaurant in the Chicago area

A Thai couple has run several authentic Thai cuisine restaurants on Chicago’s north side and in Chicago’s northern suburbs since the early 1980s. While the owners obtained residence in the early 90s using the L-1A / EB-1(3) two-step that lets experienced multinational managers or executives become permanent residents as managers or executives of a U.S.-based business, few small ethnic restaurants today can successfully rely on an intracompany transfer. In the ensuing years, their family-style restaurants won accolades by using fresh and authentic Thai ingredients, and they sponsored several chefs who invoked the clemency afforded by the now virtually dead § 245(i).

Since 2005, our restaurateurs have tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit qualified Thai cuisine chefs from the U.S. worker population. While labor certifications in 2005 (prior to the implementation of the U.S. Department of Labor’s PERM online program in that year) were mired in the Department’s mismanaged attempt to reduce backlogs, the employment third preference for other than China and India was generally current.

Ironically, not long after the implementation of PERM, around the time of our last blog, retrogression set in and has steamrolled to the point that Worldwide EB-3 is more than six years backlogged. Thus, the Thai restaurateurs in Chicago, though close to retirement, remain trapped in the kitchen. They are faced with the impossible dilemma of waiting six or more years to bring a chef over from abroad or, on the other hand, risking employer sanctions in the futile attempt to obtain permanent residence for a non-work-authorized, albeit qualified, domestic employee. They are fully aware that, without Congressional reinstitution of § 245(i), or amendment of § 212(a)(9) to provide realistic opportunities for exemption from the draconian 10-year bar, labor certification would be a colossal waste of resources and time.

An Armenian restaurant in a working-class New Jersey town

In 2003, the owner-operator sponsored a chef who had been grandfathered under § 245(i) and who left employment for greener pastures while awaiting certification of his pre-PERM labor certification.

Unable to recruit a qualified chef domestically, the owner substituted a chef who was working in the capital and largest city of Armenia, Yerevan. After overcoming numerous tribulations, in 2011 the substitute chef finally appeared before the U.S. Consulate in Yerevan. The Consul, however, requested additional financial documentation and proof that the sponsoring restaurant still existed and still intended to employ the beneficiary. Sadly, the sponsoring restaurant had fallen on hard times in the small north Jersey town of privately owned homes, half of which were underwater on their mortgages. The Consul denied the visa and returned the file to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for a recommended revocation. Ironically, the owner, himself a chef of modest skill who had been doing the cooking since the original beneficiary left six years previously, attributed the failure of his business not just to the decline of the town, but to his inability to hire a chef well versed in the nuances of authentic Armenian cuisine.

A pricey Mughlai tandoori restaurant in Manhattan’s East 50s

A restaurant dedicated to preserving luxe Delhi-style tandoori (clay oven) traditions sought the services of a highly skilled chef working at a 5-star tandoori palace in Delhi, India. Like the unsuccessful Armenian chef in Yerevan, the tandoori chef had never been to the United States. The restaurant in New York filed a labor certification in early 2003. A full decade later, the restaurant, which has undergone several changes in management, still awaits a visa appointment in light of the decades-long Indian EB-3 green card backlog. The restaurant has made do with moderately skilled chefs, including one whose original training had been at a brick oven pizzeria, but the results are less than stellar. Tandoori calzone, anyone?

A Chinese restaurant in the northernmost county of Maine

Disclaimer: I have never represented Mai Tai restaurant in Presque Isle, Maine, nor have I eaten there. However, I had heard of it even prior to its moment of infamy, when it was featured in ICE’s November 15, 2012 press release trumpeting Mai Tai’s payment of $13,744 for Form I-9 (Employment Eligibility Verification) employer-sanction violations. I was familiar with Mai Tai because I have visited several Chinese nationals, clients of mine, who teach at the Presque Isle campus of the University of Maine (UMPI), located a few blocks down US 1 from Mai Tai.

Notwithstanding Mai Tai’s hokey 1950s-esque name, my clients at UMPI assured me that the beleaguered restaurant presented a pretty decent North American version of Chinese food, and was one of the only places in town where you can get green vegetables. Presque Isle, after all, is deep in the north woods of Maine and far from the clambakes and lobster pots of cozy Kennebunkport.

While we cannot be sure what motivated Mai Tai to transgress the laws against hiring the unauthorized, it’s easy to imagine how challenging it must be to hire specialty chefs in that land of doughnuts, mooseburgers and French fries. While not as backlogged as India’s EB-3, China’s EB-3 is still set back well over six years. We lack reliable statistics on the longevity of newly established independent restaurants in Presque Isle, but a casual stroll down Third Avenue in Manhattan will confirm that the life expectancy of newly established non-franchised ethnic restaurants in the U.S. is much less than the half-life of plutonium. The fact is, most restaurants cannot wait six years, much less six months, to on-board a qualified chef.

***

In my 2005 post, I complained that § 212(a)(9)’s sting and § 245(i)’s demise were depriving the food-lovers among us of faithful representations of traditional ethnic dishes, whether they may be Venezuelan arepas (corn cakes) or Finnish pasties (meat- and vegetable-filled pastries). Now we must suffer unpalatable visa backlogs in the employment-based third preference.

0 Comments

USCIS Issues Provisional Waiver Final Rule: Beginning in March, Some Waivers of the 3- or 10-Year Bars May Be Sought Before Departing the United States

1/7/2013

0 Comments

by David Isaacson, Associate with ABIL member, Cyrus D. Mehta
The Insightful Immigration Blog

One year ago, a previous post on this blog by Cyrus Mehta and this author discussed the issuance by USCIS of a proposed rule allowing certain applicants for a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars to obtain such a waiver on a provisional basis before departing from the United States. It has been a long wait for the final rule, as USCIS needed to allow time to receive public comments (one of which was submitted by our firm) and then took a substantial amount of time to analyze the comments and determine what changes to make to the proposal, but the wait is finally over.USCIS first announced the final rule and made an advance copy available on January 2, 2013, and the final rule was officially published in the Federal Register on January 3. The rule will take effect on March 4, 2013, and sometime before then USCIS will publish the Form I-601A that is to be used to apply for a provisional waiver.

The provisional waiver rule does not change the substantive standard that one must satisfy in order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bar that one incurs upon accruing more than 180 days or a year of unlawful presence respectively. In order to obtain a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars under section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), it is always necessary to show that the waiver applicant’s spouse or parent, who is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States, will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not permitted to remain in the United States. However, under the new rule, certain applicants will be able to make this showing before they depart the United States to apply for a visa, which should dramatically shorten the amount of time that they need to spend abroad. If an applicant is seeking a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars based extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen qualifying relative (rather than an LPR), and has an approved petition as an “immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen – that is, as the U.S. citizen’sspouse, parent, or unmarried child (under the age of 21 while taking into account the Child Status Protection Act, although only applicants age 17 or older may seek provisional waivers and younger applicants would not need them because unlawful presence for these purposes does not accrue until age 18)– then the applicant may seek a provisional waiver before departing from the United States, and only go abroad to apply for an immigrant visa after the provisional waiver has already been issued. This process is subject to various restrictions, some of which are discussed further below, but that is the basic idea.

By allowing some waiver applications to be adjudicated while the applicant remains within the United States, the provisional waiver process should significantly reduce the period of time when the U.S. citizen relative of a successful waiver applicant is subject to the cruel irony that inheres in the current process. Under the current system, where the waiver application is filed while the applicant is abroad after an immigrant visa interview, and the applicant then remains abroad during the months it takes to adjudicate the waiver application, the qualifying relative must undergo months of the very same extreme hardship that the waiver is intended to avoid! At least with regard to U.S. citizen qualifying relatives of applicants who are immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and who face no other ground of inadmissibility besides unlawful presence, this new provisional waiver process should remove much of that cruel irony. It should also encourage applications by some waiver applicants who were unwilling to travel outside the United States to apply for a waiver because of the risk of long-term separation if the waiver were denied.

One detail to keep in mind is that the U.S. citizen relative to whom extreme hardship is shown in a provisional waiver application need not necessarily be the same U.S. citizen relative who has petitioned for an applicant. Indeed, the U.S. citizen petitionerneed not even be a possible qualifying relative for the 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver. A child is not a qualifying relative for purposes of obtaining a waiver of the 3- or 10-year bars, but an applicant who is sponsored by a U.S. citizen son or daughter over twenty-one years of age, and thus qualifies as an immediate relative, would be able to qualify for a provisional waiver if he or she could show extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen parent in the event that the applicant were not allowed to return to the United States-- even though a U.S. citizen parent cannot sponsor an adult son or daughter as an immediate relative. Or, an applicant with a U.S. citizen spouse, who cannot show that his or her spouse will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States, could instead obtain a provisional waiver by showing that a U.S. citizen parent will suffer extreme hardship in the applicant’s absence.

Another important detail, which has been changed from the proposed rule, is that applicants in removal proceedings will be able to seek a provisional waiver if their proceedings are administratively closed and have not been recalendered. Administrative closure, most recently addressed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Avetisyan, is a process in which a case is taken off the active calendar of an Immigration Court or the BIA without actually being terminated; one might compare it to an indefinite continuance of the case. Traditionally, it has occurred with the consent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), although Avetisyan allows for it to be sought without DHS consent, a possibility which might prove useful in the provisional-waiver context. Administrative closure has often occurred recently in the contextof the DHS exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of those who are lower priorities for removal so that DHS can focus its efforts on removing those who are its higher priorities for removal, such as those with serious criminal convictions—the process discussed in a June 17, 2011 memorandum from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton.It is admirable that USCIS realized, upon reviewing comments on the proposed rule, that no purpose would be served by denying the opportunity to apply for a provisional waiver to those whom ICE is not actively seeking to remove in any event.

One interesting consequence of this new eligibility for those with administratively closed removal cases relates to the process created by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its October 16, 2012 opinion entitled In the Matter of Immigration Petitions for Review Pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in order to avoid having to spend court time unnecessarily reviewing a removal order in cases where ICE would anyway not seek to execute the order, has created an automatic 90-day waiting period during the processing of petitions for review (although one which can be ended early by either side) to allow for discussion of whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is appropriate. In cases where the Office of Immigration Litigation that is representing the government on the petition for review determines in consultation with ICE that a case is low-priority and suitable for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the case will be remanded to the BIA for administrative closure. Thus, at least in the Second Circuit, and perhaps in other Circuits which may come to follow the lead of the Second Circuit, some who have already received final orders of removal, but who would be eligible for a provisional waiver absent such final order and have petitioned for review of the order, should be able to return their case to an administratively closed state under the new process and then apply for a provisional waiver.

In another positive development, the final rule has retreated somewhat from the initial USCIS position that the provisional waiver process would only allow for what one might call a single bite at the apple, permitting neither appeal nor re-filing, so that an applicant who was denied a provisional waiver could only proceed with the process by departing from the United States and re-applying for a conventional waiver from abroad. Although an administrative appeal is still not available, an applicant whose application for a provisional waiver is denied will be permitted under the final rule to file a new application (with the appropriate filing fee).

Not all the news from the final rule is good news, however. Unfortunately, despite the urging of many commenters, the provisional waiver process will not be available to those who are currently in removal proceedings, unless their proceedings have been administratively closed and not recalendared. It will also not be available to those who are currently subject to a final removal or deportation or exclusion order—even though those subject to such orders have long been able to file a stand-alone I-212 application for advance permission to reapply for admission prior to departure from the United States, under 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j). Unless those subject to a final order can get the case reopened and administratively closed (as for example could be possible on remand from a Court of Appeals), it appears they will need to follow the conventional waiver process from abroad, despite the resulting hardship to qualifying relatives.

The provisional waiver process also will not apply to those who are inadmissible for reasons other than the 3- or 10-year bar resulting from previous unlawful presence. Although the above-mentioned previous post on this blog, and our official comment submitted to USCIS along the same lines, advocated that provisional waivers should be available in contexts such as alleged fraud for which a waiver is needed under INA section 212(i), USCIS chose not to accept that suggestion. However, USCIS has held out the possibility of perhaps extending the provisional waiver process to other contexts once it has had a chance to observe how the initial, narrower version of the provisional waiver process works in practice.

Another restriction worth noting is that the provisional waiver will not be available to those who have already been scheduled for an immigrant visa interview as of January 3, 2013. The key question is not when the interview was scheduled to take place, or whether the applicant attended the interview, but whether the Department of State’s National Visa Center (NVC) had already acted to schedule a consular interview by January 3. If the NVC had scheduled a visa interview by January 3, the provisional waiver process will not be available. If the NVC had not acted to schedule an interview by January 3, then the subsequent scheduling of an interview will not remove one’s eligibility for the provisional waiver, although in the interest of efficiency prospective waiver applicants with a case before the NVC are advised to notify the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver before an interview is scheduled. The NVC has already begun sending emails to some prospective visa applicants advising them that they must inform the NVC of their intent to seek a provisional waiver, by sending an email to [email protected], and that failure to do so would delay the visa application.

For additional background on the final provisional waiver rule, interested readers may wish to review posts about it on the “AILA Leadership Blog” of the American Immigration Lawyers’ Association and the “Lifted Lamp” blog of Benach Ragland LLP. The New York Times has also reported on the new provisional waiver rules. Despite all of its imperfections, the final provisional waiver rule is a very positive development, an important step along the road of reducing unnecessary hardship to the qualifying relatives of waiver applicants.

0 Comments

Immigration Good Behavior -- A Riddle Riddled with Riddles

8/5/2012

0 Comments

Angelo Paparelli, ABIL Immediate Past President
Nation of Immigrators

"[A] riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma"
~ Winston Churchill

The most quotable of British Prime Ministers could well have been talking about the American immigration system rather than describing Russia in 1939. U.S. immigration law is like stratified rock, revealing layer on layer of Congressional accretions laid down over many years, with the superstructure upended in tectonic shifts triggered by the baffling and contradictory interpretations of multiple agencies and courts. Not surprisingly, Thomas Stanley in The Millionaire Next Door recommended immigration law as a career, predicting that many foreign citizens, whether affluent or less so, would find America an attractive destination and need a chaperone to guide them through the maze of red tape.

If Congress ever grows enough of a spine to tackle comprehensive immigration reform, it must do more than merely resolve the big items -- border and interior enforcement; legalization of unauthorized migrants already here; and a plan for future flows of sojourners and permanent residents. It must also strive to simplify the law.

Consider what should be a straightforward concept -- following the rules. How does a noncitizen comply with the immigration laws? What does it take to maintain legal immigration status? Sadly, the answer is as clear as fracking fluid runoff.

For example, without any malevolent intent or affirmative act of misconduct, a temporary entrant (a "nonimmigrant") through the action of a third party, say a parent or spouse, a spouse's employer, a university official, or a lawyer, can "fail to maintain nonimmigrant status," be in a condition known as "unlawful presence" and "not [be] in a lawful nonimmigrant status" -- three phrases in law or regulation that often don't mean the same thing. Thus, a hapless individual may be seen by the authorities as having violated legal status but not be unlawfully present. This could occur, as one example among many, where the person is the spouse of a J-1 exchange visitor who is working under a form of employment permission known as curricular practical training, and the J-1 worker is fired. (This outcome would arise because unlawful presence only occurs if one overstays the period of status authorized, and an exchange visitor, like an academic or vocational student, is admitted for "duration of status," a condition that carries no date-certain expiration. Go figure.)

Or, a foreign citizen can depart the U.S. holding a government certificate allowing permission to return (known as "advance parole") and then reenter in order to await the grant of a green card under the adjustment of status process. Such a person would not have maintained nonimmigrant status -- indeed would not have any legal status (because parole is not a status) -- and yet would not have violated the immigration law. In essence, he or she would be in a non-status as an applicant under color of law awaiting the grant of a pending benefit.

Or, consider a foreign person with a U.S. work permit. As I've noted in an earlier post about human levitation, you may have the right to work here but not to be here.

Or, you might have successfully changed or extended your work-visa status for one, two or three years and received from the immigration authorities an official approval notice with a clip-out status permit (the Form I-94) bearing a validity period, leave the country for a trip to see Grandma, and be readmitted with a new I-94 for a significantly shorter period. This occurs because one component of the Homeland Security Department, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), limits the I-94 to the expiration date of one's passport, while another DHS component, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), ignores the validity period of the passport, and holds that as a condition of maintaining nonimmigrant status you must always make sure your passport is unexpired.

Often, the CBP inspector at the port of entry says nothing about having short-changed the expiration date on the I-94; hence, the entrant may not realize his/her status document has been unduly shortened. The too-frequent result: An unwitting overstay occurs, thereby triggering unlawful presence. And even if the shortening of the status period is noted, the individual could reasonably believe that the longer of the two I-94s (in this case, the clip-out version) prevails over the shorter expiration period. Or s/he may be misled by the DMV who issues a driver's license with a validity period extending to the end date on the clip-out I-94.

Whether or not the person is confused or misled, a USCIS adjudicator, a consular official abroad, a CBP inspector, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer or an immigration judge, when examining the person's immigration compliance history on some future date, may well deny an immigration benefit, refuse a visa, prevent entry or order removal -- all because of confusion over the simple concept of maintaining legal immigration status.

If that's not complicated enough, the legacy agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, repeatedly floated a notion (not a published regulation) known misleadingly as the "last action rule" in order to reconcile discrepancies in ending dates on two or more I-94 status documents. The "rule" sounds simple enough: Whichever status was the last one granted ("the last action") controls the person's nonimmigrant status. Except, however, where the last action granted was based on a change rather than an extension of status, then the last action rule is inapplicable. For the stew that is the last action rule, see these confusing links: Bednarz letter, Cook Memo (and referenced Simmons letter), Hernandez letter, and unapproved AILA/INS October 17, 2001 liaison meeting minutes (Item II).

Still worse, if the immigration laws make it virtually impossible to know who's in legal status, they make it harder than a Rubik's Cube to figure out who's here illegally, as DREAM activist Prerna Lal explains in "It's More Complicated than Legal vs. Illegal," her open letter to Ruben Navarette -- which challenges his defense of the slur, "illegal immigrant."

If my effort to explain the mumbo-jumbo of immigration violations and last actions remains confusing, I ask your pardon. Be heartened, however, that errors of these types can be fixed -- assuming that the immigration agency exercises its heart (which it occasionally does). Still, it's a shame USCIS doesn't heed its stakeholders by expanding the areas of forgivable infractions and Congress does not write intelligible immigration laws for law-abiding individuals to follow, a code unlike the current immigration statutes that "yield up meaning only grudgingly" to reveal "morsels of comprehension [which] must be pried from mollusks of jargon."

0 Comments

What the Proposed Provisional Waiver Rule Means for Those Face 3- or 10-Year Bars

1/6/2012

2 Comments

by Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer and David A. Isaacson, Associate of Cyrus D. Mehta
The Insightful Immigration Blog

In the raging immigration debate concerning the millions of undocumented immigrants in the US, one important issue has received scant attention. We have yet to meet a person who has roots in the US who desires to choose to remain undocumented. Most are forced to remain undocumented even though they have a pathway to a green card due to a perverse Catch 22 effect in our immigration law as a result of the 3 and 10 year bars imposed under INA § 212(a)(9)(B).

Those who have remained unlawfully present in the US for 1 year or more face a 10 year bar to reentry if they depart the US. Similarly, those who have remained unlawfully present for more than 180 days face a 3 year bar to reentry if they depart the US. It should be noted that the term “unlawfully present” is a complex legal term and a discussion of this term is beyond the scope of this blog. These individuals, if they are the beneficiaries of an approved immigrant visa petition filed by a US citizen spouse or parent or a US citizen child (who is over 21), may often be unable to adjust their status in the US. Under INA § 245(a) one has to be inspected or paroled in order to qualify to adjust status to permanent residence in the US. Thus, a non-citizen spouse of a US citizen who previously surreptitiously crossed the border from Mexico into the US would be ineligible to adjust status because she was not inspected under § 245(a). Of course, there are exceptions to this rule too, which is beyond the scope of this blog and an article discussing these exceptions can be found here. This spouse would need to leave the US and apply for an immigrant visa at the US consulate in her home country. However, if she was unlawfully present in the US for 1 year or more, it would result in her triggering the 10 year bar to reentry. Although, under the current regime, she can apply for a waiver under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), she can only do so after she has departed the US.

Obtaining the waiver is no small matter because she has to demonstrate extreme hardship to the US citizen spouse if the waiver is denied. The emotional angst resulting from the separation of two spouses is not enough. She will need to demonstrate, in addition to the emotional issue, financial, cultural, political and health conditions, among many others, as well as the balancing of ties within and outside the US. See Matter of Cervantes, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), aff’d, Cervantes-Gonzales v. INS, 244 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, this spouse will be rolling the dice if she departs the US to chance winning the waiver while outside the US. If the waiver is denied, she will be stuck outside the US and will be separated from her loved ones. Moreover, she can only demonstrate extreme hardship to a limited universe of qualifying relatives, which include a spouse or a parent. If she has US citizen children, under INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), she cannot demonstrate extreme hardship to them if she is separated.

It is not hard to see why there has been such a huge build up of the undocumented population in the US. Even while people may be eligible for permanent residence, they are unwilling to leave and chance a waiver from outside the US. While Congress enacted INA § 212(a)(9)(B) to deter overstays, it has had the exact opposite effect. People overstay, despite being approved for a green card, because of fear of facing the 3 or 10 year bars.

It is thus heartening that the Obama administration has proposed a rule that will be published in the Federal Register on January 9, 2012 in the form of a Notice of Intent to publish such a rule, which will permit intending immigrants to apply for a provisional waiver in the US prior to their departure from the US. This rule, if published, will remove the uncertainty in leaving the US and being barred for 3 or 10 years if the waiver application is denied. Under the proposed rule, the waiver can be applied for while in the US. With the waiver in hand, the individual departing the US can more readily hope to reenter the US without facing the 10 year bar. This move has received thunderous applause from the immigration advocacy community and rightly so. In a time when Congress is virtually paralyzed and cannot even make small tweaks to improve the immigration system, the proposing of a smart administrative rule such as this one is consistent with the intent of the law. People subject to the 3 or 10 year bars still need to apply for the waiver and meet the rigorous “extreme hardship” standard, except that they can apply for it in the US prior to their departure. If they obtain the waiver, they can at least be assured of not triggering the 3 or 10 year bars upon their departure.

Apparently, if and when the rule takes effect, which under the formal rule making process may take some time, it will be limited to immediate relatives of US citizens who are seeking a § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) waiver of unlawful presence based on hardship to a US citizen, although the petitioning US citizen and the one to whom extreme hardship exists need not be the same (so that, for example, it appears that the parent of a 21-year-old US citizen petitioned for by that son or daughter would qualify if seeking a waiver based on extreme hardship to a US citizen parent, the grandparent of the petitioning relative). It appears that the rule will not cover people who are not immediate relatives of a US citizen (such as the over-21-year-old son or daughter of a US citizen who is petitioned for by their parent and not protected by the Child Status Protection Act), or whose qualifying relative for the waiver is a lawful permanent resident. It also will not cover people who need some other sort of waiver in addition, such as a waiver under INA § 212(i) for fraud. It is not entirely clear whether the proposed rule would cover people who in addition to a waiver under § 212(a)(9)(B)(v) need to obtain permission to reapply for admission because their departure will execute an order of removal and create inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(9)(A), but it would seem that it should, since such applications for permission to reapply can already be filed in advance under existing regulations-- the actual proposed rule may clarify this when it comes out. We do urge the USCIS to at least include sons and daughters of US citizens who do not qualify as immediate relatives. A child who has turned 21, and who may not be protected under the Child Status Protection Act, still remains very much part of the nuclear family especially in hard economic times when their parents are still the lifeline. These adult children, technically referred to as sons and daughters, would otherwise qualify under DREAM Act legislation, and may at least be able to take advantage of this provisional waiver if the proposed rule is adjusted to allow them to do so.

Although this new proposed rule may be portrayed as some sort of radical innovation by immigration restrictionists, it is actually nothing of the sort. The governing regulations, specifically 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(j), have long provided that one who is consular processing an immigrant visa, and will need permission to reapply for admission because his or her departure will execute an order of deportation or removal and create inadmissibility under INA § 212(a)(9)(A), can file the Form I-212 application for permission to reapply in advance of departing from the United States, and “shall receive a conditional approval depending on his or her satisfactory departure.” That is, people who will be subject to the 5- and 10-year bars based on executed removal and deportation orders (the length of the bar can vary depending on the circumstances of a removal order) have long been able to apply for advance waivers of those bars before they leave the US to consular-process an immigrant visa. This new proposed rule would simply update the regulations to create a similar procedure for the parallel 3- and 10-year bars created by IIRIRA (the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996”), for people who remove themselves from the United States after being unlawfully present even though there may have been no removal proceedings against them. It can therefore be seen as a long overdue technical fix. However, it remains to be seen how long the rule making process will take, which includes notice and comment. There is also bound to be opposition to the rule. The USCIS still has to publish rules from the enactment of IIRIRA provisions in 1996! Hopefully, the Obama administration will give this high priority as the promulgation of such a rule may even reduce the undocumented population in the US.

This technical fix could also reduce inefficiency in the era of Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010), especially if accompanied by an additional change in the proposal relating to potential issues of fraud. Under Quilantan, entering the United States at a port of entry with the permission of an immigration officer is sufficient to create eligibility for adjustment of status as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen, regardless of whether one’s entry was procedurally proper, as long as the entry did not involve a knowing false claim to U.S. citizenship. Many people who were waved through the border as passengers in a car or the like have little corroborating evidence of their manner of entry. Absent this regulation, if such a Quilantan entrant is married to a U.S. citizen and is denied adjustment because USCIS rejects their testimony regarding manner of entry, they will effectively be forced to request that removal proceedings be commenced against them so that they may testify before an Immigration Judge and seek to establish their manner of entry by credible testimony as Ms. Quilantan did in her case. Under the new procedure, some such Quilantan entrants may decide that it is simpler to seek an advance waiver of inadmissibility, as long as their qualifying relative’s particular form of extreme hardship is such that a brief trip abroad to pick up an immigrant visa will not be intolerable. If the advance waiver is approved, the already overcrowded immigration court system would then be spared the necessity of hearing testimony regarding the applicant’s manner of entry. One caveat, however, is that the current version of the proposal, which excludes waivers of fraud-related inadmissibility under INA § 212(i), could lead potential applicants and their attorneys to fear a potential finding of fraud inadmissibility by a consulate where the circumstances of the applicant’s prior entry into the United States are murky and difficult to prove (making it hard to refute an inaccurate consular suspicion that some fraud may have been committed). The potential efficiency would be much greater if the USCIS proposal were modified to allow either advance waivers under INA § 212(i), or at least an advance finding that no fraud was committed by an applicant. Otherwise, Quilantan entrants within the U.S. may be reluctant to give up their right to have an Immigration Judge (and if necessary the BIA) adjudicate their contention that they did not commit fraud in their entry, and to instead be at the mercy of an effectively unreviewable determination by a consular officer.

2 Comments

USCIS Finalizes Unlawful Presence Policy Putting F, J And M Nonimmigrants In Great Jeopardy

USCIS Improperly Blurs Distinction Between Violation of Status and Unlawful Presence for F, J and M Nonimmigrants

The Immigration-Abandonment Ploy -- Fallout from a Fiddling Congress and Bickering Allies

Waiving Goodbye to Unappealable Decisions: Indirect AAO Jurisdiction, or Why Having Your Appeal Dismissed Can Sometimes Be a Good Thing

A New Immigration Recipe: Specialty Chefs Need a Dream Act Too!

USCIS Issues Provisional Waiver Final Rule: Beginning in March, Some Waivers of the 3- or 10-Year Bars May Be Sought Before Departing the United States

Immigration Good Behavior -- A Riddle Riddled with Riddles

What the Proposed Provisional Waiver Rule Means for Those Face 3- or 10-Year Bars

TO SUBSCRIBE

ABIL

Archives

Categories