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The Guide for the Perplexed – Who is Stuck in the Green Card Backlogs

10/31/2016

by Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer
The Insightful Immigration Blog

“In the realm of Nature there is nothing purposeless, trivial, or unnecessary” ― Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed

David Bier of the Cato Institute in No One Knows How Long Legal Immigrants Will Have To Wait calculates that there are “somewhere between 230,000 and 2 million workers in the India EB-2 and EB-3 backlogs, so they’ll be waiting somewhere between half a century and three and a half centuries. It is entirely possible that many of these workers will be dead before they receive their green cards.” This is stunning, and a damming indictment of the broken and shambolic legal immigration system of the United States.

The backlogs in the India and China employment-based second (EB-2) and employment-based third (EB-3) preferences have made the employment-based immigration system completely unviable. It makes no sense for an employer to test the US labor market, obtain labor certification and classify the foreign national employee in the EB-2 and EB-3 through an approved I-140 petition, and then wait endlessly for decades for the green card. It is also hopelessly frustrating for the foreign national to be waiting endlessly. As Bier’s report points out, the wait may absurdly be beyond the lifetime of the employee and the sponsoring entity. One is also penalized based on where you were born. Although each employment-based preference has a limited supply of green cards each year set by law, the backlog is further compounded due to the per country limit. A person born in India or China, no matter what his or her present nationality may be, is charged to the country of birth. Currently, India and China are more oversubscribed than other countries in the EB-2 and EB-3 backlogs. Therefore, as espoused in The Tyranny of Priority Dates, one born in India or China suffers a worse faith than a person born in Sweden or Ghana in the employment-based backlogs, and this is tantamount to invidious discrimination.

Hence, the burning question in the mind of a perplexed foreign national stuck in the EB-2 or EB-3 backlog who was born in India and China is how can I improve my situation and get the green card more quickly? This blog will offer some guidance.

Upgrade from EB-3 to EB-2

Can you upgrade from EB-3 to EB-2? If so, your employer will have to sponsor you for a position that requires an advanced degree or a bachelor’s degree plus five years of post-baccalaureate experience. There may be circumstances where you may have been promoted or up for a promotion, and the new position may justify an advanced degree, and this may be a good opportunity to once again be sponsored for a green card under the EB-2 if you were originally sponsored under EB-3. Alternatively, a new employer can sponsor you under EB-2. If the labor certification is approved for the new position, along with the I-140 petition, the priority date from the EB-3 I-140 petition can potentially be captured for the new EB-2. You will be able to advance closer to the green card in the new EB-2 queue through this upgrade, and may also be current to receive a green card. For example, if your priority date on the EB-3 petition was November 1, 2007, and if you recaptured it for the new EB-2 petition, then you will be current, as the EB-2 India Final Action cutoff date is November 1, 2007 according to the November 2016 Visa Bulletin. The difference between a Filing Date and Final Action Date is explained below.

Not everyone can qualify for an upgrade. If you do not have the equivalent of a US Master’s degree, or the equivalent of a single source 4 year US bachelor’s degree plus 5 years of progressive experience following such a bachelor’s degree, you will likely not be eligible to qualify under the EB-2. Also, be careful about preserving the age of your child under the Child Status Protection Act, as an EB-3 to EB-2 boost may not always protect the child’s age.

Qualifying as a Person of Extraordinary Ability under EB-1A

Some may be able to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability under the employment-based first preference (EB-1A), which is current for India and China. Of course, the standard to qualify under EB-1 is extremely difficult, but it does not hurt for one to at least think about it if you readily meet three out of the ten criteria for demonstrating extraordinary ability. You may have received more acclaim over the years in your career while waiting in the backlogs without knowing it, even if you may not have won major awards or written books or published scholarly articles. For example, in business fields, people have qualified if they have made outstanding contributions of major significance to the field, worked in a leading or critical capacity for organizations with a distinguished reputation and commanded a salary higher than others in the same positions. Even if you meet 3 out of the 10 criteria, the USCIS can still subjectively determine whether you are indeed a person of extraordinary ability with sustained national or international acclaim. Thus, the USCIS can still deny an EB-1A petition even if you meet the three criteria.

Qualifying as an Outstanding Professor or Researcher under EB-1B

If you get a position in a university that is tenure track or comparable to a tenure track position, and you can demonstrate that you are an internationally recognized professor or researcher, you may be able to qualify under EB-1B, which is also current for India and China. In addition, you will need to have at least 3 years of experience in an academic area. Demonstrating yourself as an outstanding professor or researcher is slightly less demanding than demonstrating extraordinary ability as you need to meet two out of six criteria. Interestingly, one can also qualify as an outstanding researcher through a private employer if it employs at least 3 full time researchers and has achieved as an organization, or through a department or division, documented accomplishments in an academic field. Still, like with the EB-1A person of extraordinary category, the USCIS can make a negative subjective determination even after you have met two out of the six criteria in an EB-1B petition.

Qualifying as a Multinational Executive or Manger under EB-1C

Yet another option is to explore whether your employer can assign you to a foreign parent, subsidiary, branch or affiliate as an executive or manager. After fulfilling a year of qualifying employment at the overseas entity, you may be able to qualify for a green card as an intracompany transferee executive or manager under the employment-based first preference (EB-1C) if you take up a similar position with the employer in the US. The EB-1 for multinational managers and executives is also current as it is for persons of extraordinary ability.

Job Creation Investment under EB-5

For those who may have a high net worth, and have amassed over $500,000, can consider passively investing in a project within a Regional Center under the employment-based fifth preference (EB-5). Although the EB-5 is not current for China, it is current for India. Still, the EB-5 requires you to put your capital at risk, and there is always a possibility that you could lose your investment along with not being able to obtain the green card. There is also a possibility of the law changing retroactively after December 9, 2016.

Cross Chargeability through Marriage

While marrying a U.S. citizen may be the panacea to your problems, provided the marriage was in good faith, even marrying a foreign national not born in India or China would allow you to cross charge to the spouse’s country of birth, which may not be experiencing the same backlogs in the EB-3, or may be current under the EB-2.

Filing I-485 Application Under the Filing Date in Visa Bulletin

There is a small saving grace that you can use the Filing Date in the Visa Bulletin to file an I-485 adjustment of status application. Under the November 2016 Visa Bulletin, an EB-2 beneficiary, for example, can file an I-485 application for adjustment of status if his or her priority date is on or before April 22, 2009 if born in India and March 1, 2013 if born in China. While the Filing Date only allows the applicant to file, it is the Final Action date that determines whether the applicant will be granted permanent residence. Note that under the new visa bulletin system introduced since October 2015 that created the dual Filing Date and Final Action Date, the USCIS will determine whether the filing date is applicable each month for purposes of filing adjustment of status applications. In the event that the USCIS determines that the filing date is not applicable, applicants will need to rely on the final action date in order to file an adjustment of status application within the US. In November 2016, the USCIS has allowed filing I-485 applications under the Filing Date as it did in October 2016. Thus, while the Filing Date for India EB-2 is April 22, 2009, which allows for the filing of the I-485 application, the Final Action Date is November 1, 2007, which is when the green card is actually issued. Upon the filing of an I-485 application, the applicant can enjoy some of the benefits of an I-485 application such as job portability, travel permission, and open market work authorization as well as work authorization for derivative family members.

Conclusion – Continue to Advocate for Immigration Reform

While no means exhaustive, these are a few options worthy of further exploration. In the end, notwithstanding available options, you may still not qualify and be forced to remain in the EB-2 or EB-3 backlogs. Still, do not accept your fate and actively advocate for immigration reform in Congress. The Fairness for High Skilled Immigration Act, HR 213, eliminates the per country limits in the employment-based preferences and doubles the limit to 15 % to family sponsored immigrants. The bill has amassed about 127 co-sponsors from both parties, and could potentially pass if it was put up for a vote today. However, even if HR 213 becomes law, there will still be backlogs. There is also great scope to comprehensively reform and fix the broken immigration after we elect a new President and Congress. Finally, one should continue to press this and the next administration to implement administrative reforms. For example, in The Family That Is Counted Together Stays Together: How To Eliminate Immigration Visa Backlogs, Gary Endelman and I advocated that there is nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act that requires each derivative family member to be counted on an individual basis against the worldwide and country caps. If the entire family was counted as one unit, instead of separately, imagine the additional green cards that would become available, resulting in a dramatic reduction of the backlogs. There is also an arguable basis for the Filing Date to be current under the Thanksgiving Turkey theory. In conclusion, do not feel hopeless and dejected. Consider all available options, and if you are still not eligible for those options, press hard for legislative and administrative changes. Every effort has a purpose, and if it is inherently for a just cause, there is that much more of a moral imperative for it to be realized and come to fruition.

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Reviving The National Interest Waiver For International Entrepreneurs

10/24/2016

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by Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer
The Insightful Immigration Blog

A proposed rule would allow the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to use its existing discretionary statutory parole authority for entrepreneurs of startup entities whose stay in the United States would provide a “significant public benefit through the substantial and demonstrated potential for rapid business growth and job creation.” Under this proposed rule, DHS may parole, on a case-by-case basis, eligible entrepreneurs of startup enterprises:

Who have a significant ownership interest in the startup (at least 15 percent) and have an active and central role to its operations;
Whose startup was formed in the United States within the past three years; and
Whose startup has substantial and demonstrated potential for rapid business growth and job creation, as evidenced by:

– Receiving significant investment of capital (at least $345,000) from certain qualified U.S. investors with established records of successful investments;

– Receiving significant awards or grants (at least $100,000) from certain federal, state, or local government entities; or

– Partially satisfying one or both of the above criteria in addition to other reliable and compelling evidence of the startup entity’s substantial potential for rapid growth and job creation.

Under the rule, entrepreneurs may be granted an initial stay of up to two years to oversee and grow their startup entities in the United States. A subsequent request for re-parole (for up to three additional years) would be considered only if the entrepreneur and the startup entity continue to provide a significant public benefit as evidenced by substantial increases in capital investment, revenue, or job creation. What is truly lacking is the lack of a pathway to permanent residence for the entrepreneur.

Several organizations and individuals submitted comments to the rule by the deadline on October 17, 2016. The Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers, www.abil.com, of which I am a shareholder and member, also submitted comments in order to improve the rule and point out its limitations. The thrust of the comments was to make parole more accessible to entrepreneurs by lowering the investment amounts and expanding the types of persons who could qualify as investors. I was pleased to be part of the ABIL comment team of distinguished immigration attorneys, and my focus was to comment that the rule also provides a pathway to permanent residence. If the rule does not provide a pathway to permanent residency, it will not be viable at all. It is thus imperative that the rule also provide a pathway for permanent residence through the National Interest Waiver. In fact, this is not the first time that the DHS has thought about providing a pathway for permanent residence to entrepreneurs.

When USCIS announced its policy to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to take advantage of the existing immigration system on August 2, 2011, it provided Question and Answers on the Employment-based Second Preference (EB-2 Q&A) suggesting that an entrepreneur can be sponsored through a “national interest waiver”. The EB-2 (Q&A) acknowledges Matter of New York State Department of Transportation, 22 I&N Dec. 215 (Comm. 1998) (NYSDOT), which set forth a three-prong test, and how it could apply to entrepreneurs seeking the NIW.

With respect to the first two criteria under NYSDOT, the petitioner must show that he or she will be employed “in an area of substantial intrinsic merit” and that the “proposed benefit will be national in scope.” It was always difficult for an entrepreneur to show that localized employment through his or her enterprise would be national in scope. This concern was addressed in the EB-2 Q&A:

For example, the entrepreneur might be able to demonstrate that the jobs his or her business enterprise will create in a discrete locality will also create (or “spin off”) related jobs in other parts of the nation. Or, as another example, the entrepreneur might be able to establish that the jobs created locally will have a positive national impact.

The third criterion in NYSDOT is extremely opaque and difficult to overcome. The petitioner must demonstrate that “the national interest would be adversely affected if a labor certification were required for the alien. The petitioner must demonstrate that it would be contrary to the national interest to potentially deprive the prospective employer of the services of the alien by making available to U.S. workers the position sought by the alien.” The AAO went on to further illuminate this criterion as follows: “Stated another way, the petitioner, whether the U.S. employer or the alien, must establish that the alien will serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than would an available U.S. worker having the same minimum qualifications.”

Still, the EB-2 Q&A provides helpful guidance to the entrepreneur to overcome the third prong:

The entrepreneur who demonstrates that his or her business enterprise will create jobs for U.S. workers or otherwise enhance the welfare of the United States may qualify for the NIW. For example, the entrepreneur may be creating new job opportunities for U.S. workers. The creation of jobs domestically for U.S. workers may serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than the work of others in the same field.

Nevertheless, if the parole rule provides guidance on how to seek a NIW, it should do away with the NYSDOT test, especially the subjective third criterion. Indeed, when President Obama’s executive actions on immigration were announced on November 20, 2014, a memo specifically aimed to improve the system for skilled immigrants also sought to:

Clarify the standard by which a national interest waiver may be granted to foreign inventors, researchers and founders of start-up enterprises to benefit the U.S economy

ABIL therefore suggests that the final rule should contain a rebuttable presumption stating that an international entrepreneur who has maintained parole status for five years is presumed to qualify for the national-interest waiver. The five years should be extended for entrepreneurs who have already started the permanent residency process, however long it takes, given the processing delays and backlogs. Alternatively, because of prolonged visa quota backlogs, those which adversely affect persons in the EB-2 and EB-3 preferences such as beneficiaries born in India and China, ABIL suggests that entrepreneurial parolees be able to use the NYSDOT national-interest waiver standards to qualify as a person of extraordinary ability under INA § 203(b)(1)(A). Even if an entrepreneur cannot readily meet the three out of ten criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), the petitioner can also qualify as a person of extraordinary ability by submitting comparable evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4). Hence, the final rule should expressly provide that comparable evidence includes (but is not limited to) proof that an entrepreneur meets the NYSDOT national-interest waiver criteria, and thus may qualify as a person of extraordinary ability.

Given the lack of certainty in a national-interest waiver adjudication due to NYSDOT, ABIL further suggests that the seven factors set forth in the non-precedent decision of Matter of Mississippi Phosphate, EAC 92 091 50126 (AAU July 21, 1992) be reconsidered. The seven factors include 1) improving the U.S. economy; 2) improving wages and working conditions of U.S. workers; 3) improving education and training programs for U.S. children and underqualified workers; 4) improving health care; 5) providing more affordable housing for young and/or older, poorer U.S. residents; 6) improving the environment of the U.S. and making more productive use of natural resources; or 7) involving a request from an interested U.S. government agency. This decision provided good guidance for the national interest waiver petitioner as well as the adjudicating officer and seemed to signal an understanding of congressional intent.

The EB-2 Q&A appears to suggest that the entrepreneur can also be sponsored for a green card under the EB-2 through a labor certification. In fact, an entrepreneur who cannot qualify under EB-2, can also theoretically obtain labor certification for purposes of obtaining permanent residency under EB-3. The DOL, on the other hand, has always frowned upon an owner of an entity being sponsored for a labor certification. In order to obtain labor certification, the employer must establish that it has conducted a good faith test of the labor market and that there were no qualified US workers who were available for the position. The DOL has denied labor certification to both 100% and minority owners of companies who filed a labor certification on their behalf. See ATI Consultores, 07-INA-64 (BALCA Feb. 11, 2008); M. Safra & Co. Inc., 08-INA-74 (BALCA Oct. 27, 2008). The test for determining whether an employee closely tied to the sponsoring entity could qualify for labor certification was set forth in Modular Container Systems, Inc. 89-INA-228 (BALCA July 16, 1991) (en banc), where BALCA applied a “totality of circumstances” test to determine whether there was a bona fide job offer to US workers. Modular Container Systems considers whether the foreign national:

a) Is in a position to control or influence hiring decisions regarding the job for which LC is ought;
b) Is related to the corporate directors, officers or employees;
c) Was an incorporator or founder of the company;
d) Has an ownership interest in the company;
e) Is involved in the management of the company;
f) Is on the board of directors;
g) Is one of a small number of employees;
h) Has qualifications for the job that are identical to specialized or unusual job duties and requirements stated in the application; or
i) Is so inseparable from the sponsoring employer because of his or her pervasive presence and personal attributes that the employer would be unlikely to continue without the foreign national.

An entrepreneur who may successfully obtain parole will most likely fail under the Modular Container Systems “totality of circumstances” test. ABIL suggests that USCIS consult with the DOL before issuing this guidance so that DOL be receptive to the USCIS’s new policy of encouraging entrepreneurs and liberally interpret Modular Container Systems, which are incorporated in 20 CFR §656.17(l). For example, if an entrepreneur who qualifies for parole and owns a minority state in the enterprise should still be able to obtain labor certification if he or she did not influence the recruitment, even if the entrepreneur may have been a founder or is on its board of directors.

In conclusion, quite independent of the parole rule, the proposed broadening of the National Interest Waiver should also similarly be applicable to entrepreneurs who have used existing nonimmigrant visa categories. This is explained in the Entrepreneur Pathways portal. Indeed, the parole rule and the Entrepreneur Pathways should exist alongside each other. Neither is perfect, especially in the absence of a Congressionally mandated startup visa, but if an entrepreneur cannot qualify under the parole policy, every encouragement must be given for the entrepreneur to qualify for a visa through his or her startup under the existing visa system, such as through an H-1B visa. In order to provide viability to both the parole rule and existing policy supporting entrepreneurs, the National Interest Waiver ought to be broadened. Most importantly, entrepreneurs born in India and China should also be allowed to take advantage of the person of extraordinary ability category under EB-1. The EB-1 is current for these countries. It would be unviable for the beneficiary of an EB-2 National Interest Waiver born in India or China to wait for several years to obtain the green card. It is hoped that this administration and the next does everything in their power to attract foreign entrepreneurs.

Given the centrality of immigrant entrepreneurs to the American economy, it may come as a shock to many when they realize that, on an increasing number, immigrant entrepreneurs are going home. With the economic renaissance in India, China, Korea, Chile, Mexico and other traditional sources of immigration, while entrepreneurs continue to come to America, we are, it seems, no longer the only game in town. Faced with uncertain green card prospects and what appears as an unfriendly and intractable immigration system that questions their value rather than welcoming their talent or appreciating their contributions, immigrant entrepreneurs are having second thoughts. It is impossible to understand or appreciate the current entrepreneurial initiative without this foundation. It is therefore hoped that this administration and the next does everything in their power to attract foreign entrepreneurs to the United States.

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BALCA Holds That Failure To Disclose A ‘Wage Adjustment’ Is Not A Valid Denial Ground

10/18/2016

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by Cora-Ann Pestaina, Partner with ABIL member, Cyrus D. Mehta
The Insightful Immigration Blog
Recently, in the representative case, Matter of Cognizant Technology Solutions US Corp, 2013-PER-01488 (BALCA, September 29, 2016), the Board of Alien Labor Certifications Appeals (BALCA) reversed 382 PERM denials finding, most significantly, that the employer’s failure to apprise US workers of its wage adjustment – a variable amount of money to be paid to the employee depending on where they’re geographically based – was not a valid ground for denial.

In the representative case, the employer, in response to an audit notification, submitted a copy of an offer letter that was sent to a U.S. applicant. This offer letter stated a base salary of $117,707.20 and also described a “Cost of Labor Adjustment” or “COLA” as follows:

As eligible, you may be paid a geographically based Cost of Labor Adjustment (COLA) of $250.00 per pay period for Washington, D.C., which is an annualized amount of $6,000. Your COLA on the 15th and last day of each month in accordance with the Company’s current payroll policies and practices, along with your regular base salary. [sic] If your work location changes, then there will be an adjustment to COLA effective the first day of work in your new work location. COLA is subject to regular review and may be increased or decreased, or replaced by another compensation component upon certain promotions.

The Certifying Officer (CO) found that the employer’s Notice of Filing (NOF), which advised of a long and short term travel requirement, failed to also appropriately apprise US workers of the actual terms and conditions of employment. The CO found that the NOF violated 20 CFR §656.17(f)(3) which states that advertisements must “provide a description of the vacancy specific enough to apprise the U.S. worker of the job opportunity for which certification is sought” and 656.10(d)(4) which requires that the NOF “contain the information required for advertisements by §656.17(f).” The CO also found that the job order, Sunday newspaper advertisements, local newspaper advertisement, job search website advertisement and private employment firm advertisement failed to apprise US workers of the COLA and therefore did not appropriately apprise them of the job opportunity in violation of 656.17(f)(3). The CO, in denying the application, held that US workers were not properly notified that they would be appropriately compensated based on the specific geographic area of assignment, which could have impacted whether or not they were willing to apply for the job opportunity.

In its Request for Reconsideration/Request for Review, the employer argued that COLA was a “per diem benefit payment” which did not need to be disclosed based on BALCA’s previous decision in Matter of Emma Willard School, 2010-PER-01101 (BALCA, September 28, 2011). In Emma Willard, BALCA held that there is no obligation for an employer to list every item or condition of employment in its advertisements and listing none does not create an automatic assumption that no employment benefits exist. I previously blogged about this decision here. The employer argued that COLA is a not a guaranteed benefit and can be increased, decreased or replaced by other compensation at any time and to insist that such a benefit be disclosed would be similar to insisting that the employer also disclose benefits such as parking and gym memberships, which the regulations do not require.

BALCA found that the CO correctly classified COLA as a wage adjustment because it is a set amount “per pay period”, even if the exact amount may change, and is paid on the 15th and last day of each month along with the base salary. BALCA further found that this is different from a per diem benefit, which refers to something paid on a daily basis (citing Mirriam-Webster’s definition of “per diem” as “by the day”) or to reimbursements for travel receipts or meals (pointing to the U.S. General Services Administrations’ definition of “per diem” as an allowance for lodging…meals and incidental expenses). BALCA cited the case of Crowley v. U.S., 57 Fed. Cl. 376, 381 (2003) where the court cited a 1990 Conference Report discussing the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act which stated that a locality adjustment was considered part of base pay. BALCA therefore held that, based on the federal government’s characterization of a locality benefit as part of base pay, COLA must also be considered part of base pay. Since COLA is a wage and not a benefit, BALCA held that the holding in Emma Willard did not apply.

If COLA is a wage adjustment then isn’t the employer required to list it in all its advertisements and on the NOF? BALCA held that since there is no requirement that an employer list a wage in its newspaper advertisements, the employer’s failure to do so is not a violation of the regulations. Also, citing its decision in Symantec Corporation, 2011-PER-01856 (Jul. 30, 2014) which I previously discussed here, BALCA held that the job order and additional recruitment steps could not held deficient pursuant to 656.17(f)(3) because 656.17(f) applies only to newspaper advertisements. If the advertisements were not deficient, then 656.24(b)(2) is not a valid ground for denial because the employer did properly recruit for the position.

But BALCA has left a pretty bloody trail when it comes to lack of disclosures in the NOF. In Matter of KFI, Inc. 2009-PER-00288 (Aug. 25, 2009) BALCA affirmed a PERM denial based on the employer’s failure to list the CO’s address on NOF in violation of 656.10(d)(3)(iii). In Servion Global Solutions, Inc., 009-PER-00282 (Jun. 23, 2009) BALCA held that failure to state the rate of pay constituted grounds for denial. In Matter of Innopath Software, 2009-PER-00153 (Sept. 2, 2009), BALCA held that the absence of the employer name on the NOF, although it was posted in a conspicuous location at the place of employment, was not harmless error. In Matter of G.O.T. Supply, Inc., 2012-PER-00429 (Oct. 6, 2015) BALCA affirmed the CO’s denial where the company president’s name but not employer’s name was listed on the NOF. BALCA said persons providing information to the CO need the employer name as it appears on Form 9089. The NOF is required to contain certain information as specified in 20 CFR § 656.10(d) which provides that the NOF “must state the rate of pay (which must equal or exceed the prevailing wage entered by the SWA on the prevailing wage request form).” Failure to list the rate of pay wage in the NOF usually constitutes grounds for denial of certification. But this time, the deficiencies of the PERM process and the Form 9089 could not be overcome.

Despite its conclusion that the regulations could reasonably be interpreted to require an employer to state a wage adjustment on a NOF, BALCA declined to affirm the denial because the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) has issued no guidance whatsoever alerting employers that this type of wage adjustment needs to be specifically disclosed in the advertising and on the ETA Form 9089. BALCA also noted that there is “neither an instruction nor a current mechanism by which an employer may enter this information on the Form 9089 and cited Federal Insurance Co., 2008-PER-00037 (Feb. 20, 2009) in which case the fact that certain mandatory language pertaining to an alternative requirement under Matter of Francis Kellogg, 1994-INA-465 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en banc), did not appear on the ETA Form 9089 was not fatal as there is no space on the form for such language. Because employers have not been provided with notice of its regulatory interpretation concerning the requirement that COLAs be disclosed and a mechanism by which to disclose COLAs, BALCA could not find the NOF defective.

As an aside, it is also interesting to note that the foreign national resided in Florida rather than in Washington, DC, but BALCA did not attach any significance to this fact. It still raises a question about the importance of differentiating between a future job opportunity in a labor certification and a foreign national’s current employment. It was not clear in the representative case whether Washington DC, which was the subject of the COLA, would be the future position. The PERM labor certification was presumably filed using the employer’s headquarters, and indicated that it would involve working at “unanticipated client locations throughout the US.” If the current position provides a COLA, but the future position that is the subject of the labor certification does not, then the fact that the employer submitted a job offer letter with respect to the current position should not undermine the outcome of the labor certification. In responding to an audit notification, employers must clearly specify whether a job offer letter sent to a US worker applicant is applicable to the future PERM position or to the current position in order to attempt to stave off a similar denial.

Also quite interesting is BALCA’s insertion of a footnote acknowledging that the employer, in its prevailing wage request, negatively answered the question about whether the position will be performed at multiple worksites but then indicated on the Form 9089 that work would also be performed at “unanticipated client locations throughout the US.” BALCA acknowledged that the prevailing wage issued by the National Prevailing Wage Center may have been affected had the employer disclosed the roving nature of the position. BALCA provided no explanation as to why this did not constitute grounds for denial. Possibly because the immigration bar continues to beg in vain for clarification on issues related to roving employees.

This decision follows the trend of Infosys Ltd., 2016-PER-00074 (May 12, 2016), also cited in Cognizant, where BALCA held that it was not fundamentally fair to require an employer’s advertisements and Form 9089 to disclose the possibility of relocation in absence of notice or guidance especially since the DOL had previously approved over 500 similar PERM applications by the employer. In Infosys, BALCA recognized that PERM, an attestation-based program places a heavy burden on employers to be careful in preparing their applications but also places a related burden on the CO to ensure that employers are given adequate guidance on what will be demanded of them. These decisions highlight the frustrating deficiencies in the existing PERM regulations and Form 9089. Updates to the PERM program have long been anticipated by both employers and foreign nationals who each expect to benefit from the PERM modernization. DOL officials previously commented that they expect the new regulation to be finalized and implemented before the end of President Obama’s administration in January 2017.

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Beware the Justice Department’s Stealthy Grab for Enhanced Power to Enforce Immigration Discrimination Rules

10/13/2016

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by Angelo Paparelli, Past ABIL President
Nation of Immigrators

[Blogger’s Note: Today is the last day to submit comments to the Justice Department on its proposed rule which would modify its immigration-related antidiscrimination regulations, which are enforced by the Office of Special Counsel for Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices (the Special Counsel). The proposal’s fine print reveals that DOJ’s effort is in essence an unlawful power grab that would expand the time for the Special Counsel to file a claim before an Administrative Law Judge from 180 days to five years, strengthen the government’s hand in proving its case, and strip employers of legitimate defenses. My colleague, Maura Travers, and I drafted a comment which lays out why this grab for power should be stopped. Today, on behalf of the Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers, I submitted the following ABIL comment without the caption and byline of this post. Stay tuned for the final rule. Meantime, see all public comments here. Comments of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are accessible at the preceding links.]

Beware the Justice Department’s Stealthy Grab for Enhanced Power to Enforce Immigration Discrimination Rules
By Angelo A. Paparelli and Maura Travers

Submitted Electronically via https://www.regulations.gov
Hon. Loretta E. Lynch
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice

RE: Comment on Proposed Rulemaking entitled “Standards and Procedures for the Enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act,” 81 Fed. Reg. 53965, with deadline extended, 81 Fed. Reg. 63155. [CRT Docket No. 130; AG Order No. 3726-2016] RIN 1190-AA71

Dear Attorney General Lynch:

This comment will respond to your Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled Standards and Procedures for the Enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 53965 (the proposed rule). I submit this comment on behalf of the Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers, of which I am a member, and in my capacity as a lawyer who has litigated numerous administrative claims of unfair immigration-related employment practices. The views I express are those of ABIL and me, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any other person or entity.

ABIL is comprised of 19 of the top U.S. business immigration law firms and practice groups, each led by a prominent member of the U.S. immigration bar. ABIL member firms employ over 250 attorneys (700+ total staff) devoted to business immigration in 25 major U.S. cities, and 25 international destinations. A number of our ABIL members have served as a past President or as members of the Board of Governors of AILA (the American Immigration Lawyers Association), the 11,000-member organization comprised of most U.S. immigration lawyers. Our ABIL lawyers are also immigration law professors at prominent law schools, and have written well regarded immigration treatises and textbooks. ABIL regularly comments on proposed rules and draft agency memoranda.

Introduction. The proposed rule would amend 28 CFR § 44 — which was codified to enforce § 102 of the Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) — in order to incorporate the statutory text as amended by § 421 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The current rule prohibits certain unfair immigration-related employment practices and designates the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employer Practices (Special Counsel) to investigate complaints.

As explained below, the proposed rule, without adequate or convincing justification, would inter alia unlawfully expand the class of individuals protected against citizenship status discrimination to include all non-citizens, and unfairly expand the liability of employers and other respondents alleged to have engaged in unfair immigration-related employment practices. These changes contravene the statutory text and the legislative history of the governing statutes, and would impose unreasonable burdens on employers, even though an employer’s actions were not motivated by immigration-related animus or hostility. The proposed rule would also substantially expand the authority of the Special Counsel to investigate allegations of immigration-related unfair employment practices and the time periods within which individuals and the Special Counsel must file complaints against employers with the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO).

Overly Broad Proposed Definition of Citizenship Status. Proposed 28 CFR § 44.101(c) would provide a new definition of the phrase “citizenship status” found in Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 274B [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b] to mean “an individual’s status as a U.S. citizen or national, or non-U.S. citizen, including the immigration status of a non-U.S. citizen.” By statute, however, the protection against citizenship status discrimination only applies to certain protected individuals, not to all non-citizens. Protected individuals under § 274B include only U.S. citizens, certain lawful permanent residents who are taking timely steps to become U.S. citizens through naturalization, and persons granted classification as refugees, asylees or temporary residents under IRCA’s 1986 legalization program (assuming that such temporary residents still exist).
The citizenship-status definition should not be expanded to include all non-citizens but only to persons who are protected individuals under INA § 274B. Thus, the definition must be narrowed so that, as revised, it would expressly exclude the following foreign nationals (1) lawful permanent residents who have not timely pursued naturalization, (2) applicants for asylum or refugee status, and (3) foreign citizens in the United States, with or without a particular legal status, who are not “protected individuals” under § 274B.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) offers Kamal-Griffin v. Cahill Gordon & Reindel, 3 OCAHO no. 568, 1641, 1647 (1993), as justification for the inclusion of all non-citizens in the proposed definition of citizenship status. That decision, however, is inapplicable because the supposed proposition for which the Special Counsel cites the case is obiter dictum — given that the claimant, Ms. Kamal-Griffin, was a U.S. lawful permanent resident. As a result, this case only provides justification for limiting the class of non-citizens to persons who are statutorily protected against citizenship status discrimination, including lawful permanent residents such as that claimant. In Kamal-Griffin, the Administrative Law Judge stated:

IRCA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the term “citizenship status” to refer both to alienage and to non-citizen status. The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (“Committee”), recognizing the importance of an authorized individual’s right to work, stated its rationale for prohibiting employment discrimination based on citizenship status:

The Committee does not believe barriers should be placed in the path of permanent residents and other aliens who are authorized to work and who are seeking employment particularly when such aliens have evidenced an intent to become U.S. citizens. It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require them to work and then allow employers to refuse to hire them because of their immigration (non-citizenship) status. Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimination based on alienage or non-citizen status, the Committee is of the view that the instant legislation must do so.

H.R. Rep. No. 682, Part 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5674. (Emphasis added.)

Clearly, then, Kamal-Griffin stands for the proposition that only narrowly prescribed categories of non-citizens are eligible to assert citizenship status discrimination, namely, lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees. Accordingly, the definition of citizenship status should be correspondingly narrowed to exclude non-citizens who are not “protected individuals” under § 274B.

Proposed Elimination of Burden on Special Counsel to Prove Animus or Hostility. Among the most pernicious amendments to the current regulation sought by the DOJ in the proposed rule would hold employers liable for citizenship status discrimination if they treat employees or applicants for employment differently based on their immigration status, regardless of whether there is proof of animus or hostility involved. The proposed rule would amend the discriminatory intent requirement by incorporating the term “discriminate” as the term is allegedly now defined in § 274B following enactment of § 421 of IIRIRA in 1996. The proposed rule seeks to clarify that “discrimination means the act of intentionally treating an individual differently, regardless of the explanation for the discrimination, and regardless of whether it is because of animus or hostility.”
The Special Counsel’s position seems to be that the DOJ must merely prove that the employer intended the natural and foreseeable consequence of its actions and that essentially violations can be found on virtually a strict liability basis. That position is incompatible with the current regulation and the cases interpreting INA § 274B. To establish a violation under applicable case law, the Special Counsel must prove that an employer knowingly and intentionally discriminated on the basis of citizenship status.

The regulations interpreting INA § 274B provide:

(a)(1) General. It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity to knowingly and intentionally discriminate or to engage in a pattern or practice of knowing and intentional discrimination against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from employment-

Because of such individual’s national origin;

In the case of a protected individual, as defined in 44.101(c), because of such individuals’ citizenship status.

28 C.F.R. § 44.200 (emphasis added.) Sections (a)(2) and (a)(3) describe the companion retaliation and documentation abuse provisions, which are defined as “unfair immigration-related employment practices,” subject to the same standard. Id.

The cases discussing the statute and regulations make clear that a specific, discriminatory intent must motivate any alleged violation of anti-discrimination provisions of INA § 274B.

Instructive is the case of U.S.A. v. Diversified Technology & Services of Virginia, Inc., 9 OCAHO 1095 (2003). In that case, the Special Counsel maintained, just as in the proposed rule, that “intentional discrimination does not require proof that the employer subjectively harbored some special, hostility, toward the protected group, only that the employment decision was premised upon the protected characteristic.” Diversified Technologies, 9 OCAHO 1095. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected that analysis, finding instead that

The adverse decision must be shown to have actually been made by reason of, on account of, or on the basis of the protected characteristic. . . . This means at a minimum that there must be a factual basis upon which a rational fact-finder could infer a causal connection; the nexus cannot be established just by a formulaic assertion that the protected characteristic was the reason.”

Id. at 19. (Emphasis added.) The court also ruled:

Congress did not intend that all mistakes in the verification process should give rise to penalties under § 1324b either; by amending 1324(b)(a)(6) in the manner it did, Congress has specifically instructed us that errors in carrying out documentary inquiries for purposes of § 1324a compliance can now be penalized under § 1324 only where there is a showing that there actually was a discriminatory intent.

Id. at 21 (emphasis added). See also, Ondina-Mendez v. Sugar Creek Packing Co., 9 OCAHO 1085 (2002) (holding that “[t]he addition of the intent requirement means that now an employer may avoid liability if the employer can present persuasive evidence that its request for additional documents, its refusal to accept verification documents that appear genuine on their face, was made for legitimate reasons not attributable to discrimination.”)

Given these decisions, the proposed rule should be revised so that the Special Counsel must still present direct evidence of a discriminatory intent, hostility or animus in order to establish a violation of the statutory protection against citizenship status discrimination.

Unjustifiable Expansion of Time Periods for Investigation and Deadlines to File Complaints. Under the current regulations at 28 CFR § 44, an individual or an organization may file a charge with the Special Counsel within 180 days of the alleged occurrence of an immigration-related unfair employment practices. If the Special Counsel receives a charge more than 180 days after the alleged occurrence, the Special Counsel must dismiss the charge with prejudice.

The proposed rule would vastly expand the Special Counsel’s investigatory timeframe by granting the Special Counsel discretion to apply the principles of “waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling” to investigate charges filed beyond the 180-day filing deadline. These expanded “equitable” provisions provide the Special Counsel with immense leeway to obviate the statutory 180-day filing deadline found in INA § 274B.

As provided in § 274B and 28 CFR § 44, the Special Counsel must undertake an investigation of a charge and file a complaint before an administrative law judge (ALJ) within 120 days of receipt of the charge. If the Special Counsel declines to file a complaint, the charging party must file a complaint with an ALJ within 90 days after receipt of the Special Counsel’s letter of determination.

Under the proposed rule, however, the Special Counsel will not be bound by the statutory time limits that are applicable to individuals filing private actions. The Special Counsel’s authority to file a complaint based on a charge by a complaining party would be subject to the “equitable limits on the filing of a complaint.” In other words, the Special Counsel would have up to five years to file a complaint with the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO).

As a practical matter, the elimination of the current deadlines, quite foreseeably, would be extremely burdensome and disruptive to employers who are asked to produce documents for inspection during an investigation — including Employment Eligibility Verification Forms (Forms I-9) — up to five years after an alleged occurrence. Under the current U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services I-9 regulations, employers are only required to retain Forms I-9 for terminated employees for a maximum of three years after the date of hire or one year after the date of termination, whichever is later.

Even more troubling, the proposed rule would inexplicably eliminate the current 180-day limit within which the Special Counsel may file a complaint alleging an unfair immigration-related employment practice with the OCAHO. In making this proposal, the DOJ does not explain why it is no longer reasonable to continue with the current rule which was found acceptable to the Department in 1987, as shown in the excerpt from the Supplementary Information accompanying the current rule:

Section 44.304 Special Counsel acting on own initiative.

Section 44.304(b) has been amended in the final rule to limit the period of time in which the Special Counsel. on his or her own initiative. may, investigate and file a complaint of an unfair immigration-related employment practice. We believe that requiring a complaint to be filed within 180 days of the occurrence of an unfair immigration-related employment practice is a reasonable implementation of the desire of Congress reflected in 8 U.S.C. 1324b(d)(1), (3), to place a time limit on the actions of the Special Counsel.

52 Fed. Reg. 37402, 37409 (Oct. 6, 1987). (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, these proposed changes unjustifiably expanding the time periods for investigation and the deadlines to file complaints, should not be adopted. The current rule should stay the same. If in a given case equitable principles ought to be applied to extend these time periods, then the decision to do so should be reposed solely in the discretion of the Administrative Law Judge based on the evidence presented.

Misleading Change of Definition of Charging Party. The proposed rule contains an amended definition of the term “charging party.” It would replace the word “individual” with the term “injured party.” The DOJ maintains that the changed term is merely undertaken “in order to simplify the regulatory text.” The definition of charging party should remain as it now is or be clarified to eliminate the impression, even if only subliminally, that an individual filing a claim has been “injured.” Use of the phrase, “injured party,” will then likely appear in every OCAHO published decision where a person files a claim, even in cases where an Administrative Law Judge has dismissed the claim as unproven. The mere assertion of injury is insufficient to be given the designation of “injured party.” This term in the definition should remain the same or be changed to a neutral term, such as “claimant.”

* * *

For these reasons, Attorney General Lynch, you should reject the Special Counsel’s proposed changes to the current regulations. The changes reflect the unlawful and unfair placement of the government’s finger on the scales of justice. When Congress enacted INA § 274B, and amended it with the enactment of IIRIRA, it could never have been envisioned that the 1996 limitations on the authority of the Special Counsel would be used as justification for a wholesale expansion of governmental power and the regulatory elimination of lawful defenses that employers may assert before an ALJ. The scales of justice are in equipoise. They should remain that way.

Respectfully submitted,

The Alliance of Business Immigration Lawyers

Angelo A. Paparelli, member

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Immigration Inadmissibility, Legal Ethics And Marijuana

10/9/2016

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by Cyrus D. Mehta, ABIL Lawyer
The Insightful Immigration Blog

Although medical and recreational marijuana activities are illegal under federal law, at least 25 states have legalized marijuana for medical use. Colorado, Washington, Oregon and Alaska have gone even further by legalizing some forms of recreational marijuana, including its production and sale.

This conflict between federal and state law creates a curious anomaly for the foreign national who wishes to enter the United States either as a temporary visitor or as a temporary resident. If a foreign national wishes to invest in a marijuana business in a state where it is legal, and even endeavor to obtain an E-2 investor visa, this person would likely be rendered inadmissible under federal statutory immigration provisions.

Under 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), foreign nationals can be found inadmissible if the authorities know, or have reasonable ground to believe, that they seek to enter the United States to engage in any unlawful activity. Also, under INA 212(a)(2)(C), a foreign national can also be deemed inadmissible if the authorities know or have reason to believe that the person is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance as defined under 21 U.S.C. 802, which includes marijuana.

If the foreign national has actually used marijuana in a state where it is legal, or undertaken other legal business activities involving marijuana in that state, this person can be found inadmissible for admitting to committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a law relating to a controlled substance pursuant to INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

The Department of Justice has set forth guidance in a Memorandum by Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole (“Cole Memorandum”) explaining circumstances where it will exercise prosecutorial discretion and not enforce the law. Specifically, the Cole Memorandum states that it will defer to state law enforcement concerning state laws with respect to marijuana activities, although such discretion will not be applied relating to the following eight circumstances:

Distribution to minors;
Money flows to criminal enterprises;
Prohibition diversion of marijuana from states where marijuana is legal to other states;
Use of legal marijuana as a pretext for trafficking other illegal drugs or activity;
Preventing violence or the use of firearms in connection with marijuana collection or distribution;
Preventing drugged driving or other public health issues;
Preventing marijuana growth on public lands; and
Preventing marijuana possession on federal property.

Although the Cole Memorandum makes clear that it will not enforce marijuana activities that do not implicate its eight priorities in states where it is legal, it still considers manufacture, possession and distribution of marijuana as a federal crime. Thus, it may be difficult for a non-citizen who has been denied a visa to invoke the Cole Memorandum as a defense in demonstrating that the proposed marijuana activities will not be considered as an unlawful activity. Until there is a federal law that legalizes specific marijuana activities, the foreign national will find it extremely difficult to be admitted into the United States to pursue such activities even in states where it is legal.

It is also likely that a consul may question one who wishes to enter to undertake marijuana activities whether he or she has personally used marijuana, which could then potentially count as an admission to a violation of a law involving a controlled substance. However, in order to count as an admission, the BIA set forth the following requirements for a validly obtained admission: (1) the admitted conduct must constitute the essential elements of a crime in the jurisdiction in which it occurred; (2) the applicant must have been provided with the definition and essential elements of the crime in understandable terms prior to making the admission; and (3) the admission must have been made voluntarily. See Matter of K-, 7 I&N Dec. 594 (BIA 1957). If this strict protocol is not adhered to, then a non-citizen should arguably not be considered to be have admitted to committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a law relating to a controlled substance pursuant to INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

If the foreign national wishes to directly set up or be involved in a marijuana business in a state where it is legal, which includes its sale or distribution, this would most likely be problematic under federal immigration law. The question is whether activities that are more remote, such as a foreign national seeking to enter the United States on an H-1B visa to join an advertising firm as a creative director where one of its clients is a marijuana business in Colorado, would be considered equally problematic under federal immigration law. The H-1B worker will direct the advertising strategy for this client among several other clients, who are not in the marijuana business. Such a person seeking admission under the H-1B visa who is remotely connected to the marijuana business in another capacity should not be found inadmissible under the immigration laws.

The same reasoning should apply to a foreign national lawyer who will be employed in a New York law firm that specialized in health law. The law firm requires its lawyers to advise hospital clients in complying with New York’s Compassionate Care Act (“CCA”) – a law permitting the use of medical marijuana in tightly controlled circumstances. Under the CCA, health care providers and other entities may apply to be selected as Registered Organizations authorized to manufacture and dispense medical marijuana. The lawyer will assist clients, among other things, in applying to be selected as a Registered Organization, and would also advise thereafter with respect to compliance.

New York Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.2(d) provides:

A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent, except that the lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client

Rule 1.2(d), variations of which are incorporated in most state bar rules of professional responsibility, is one of the most important ethical rules. It point-blank prohibits a lawyer from advising a client to engage in illegal or fraudulent conduct. Rule 1.2(d), however, provides an exception for the lawyer to discuss the consequences of the proposed illegal conduct even though it does not allow the lawyer to assist the client with respect to the illegal conduct. It would be difficult for a New York lawyer to comply with Rule 1.2(d) with respect to advising a client under the CCA, as it would require the lawyer to counsel the health care client about medical marijuana activities that the lawyer knows is illegal under federal law although it is legal under the New York law. Under the CCA, the lawyer would not be able to competently represent the client by resorting to the exception under Rule 1.2(d), which is to “discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of [illegal] conduct with a client.” Such a Registered Organization client would require active advice regarding the manufacture and distribute medical marijuana in compliance with the CCA.

New York State Bar Ethics Opinion 1024 endeavors to resolve this conundrum for the New York lawyer by permitting him or her to “assist a client in conduct designed to comply with state medical marijuana law, notwithstanding that federal narcotics law prohibits the delivery, sale, possession and use of marijuana and makes no exception for medical marijuana.” N.Y. State 1024 took into consideration the Cole Memorandum’s potential non-enforcement of federal law in states where marijuana activities have been rendered legal. While lack of rigorous enforcement of a law does not ordinarily provide a green light for the lawyer to advise a client to engage in activities that violate the law, N.Y. State 1024 took into consideration that New York state had explicitly authorized and regulated medical marijuana, and the federal government had indicated in the Cole Memorandum that it would not take measures to prevent the implementation of state law. Accordingly, pursuant to N.Y. State 1024, a lawyer may give legal assistance to a client regarding the CCA that goes beyond “a mere discussion of the legality of the client’s proposed conduct.” Consistent with similar opinions from ethics committees in Arizona and Kings County, Washington where recreational marijuana activities have been legalized, N.Y. State 1024 held that “state professional conduct rules should be interpreted to promote state law, not to impede its effective implementation.” This is not to say that all ethics opinions are in concert with N.Y. State 1024. A recently issued Ohio ethics opinion goes the other way by limiting the lawyer’s advice to determining the scope and consequences of medical marijuana activity, which is legal in Ohio. It also goes on to state that a lawyer who personally uses medical marijuana, even if legal in Ohio, may adversely reflect on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, and overall fitness to practice law. Just as lawyers are caught in a state of flux due to the conflict between state and federal law, so are other professionals, such as Certified Public Accountants. Businesses engaging in legal marijuana activities in states where it is legal are not allowed to take business expense deductions for federal income tax purposes for activities illegal under federal law, although they have to declare income from both legal and illegal activities, but may be allowed to deduct expenses under state law.

Keeping this framework in mind, if a foreign lawyer applies for an H-1B visa to join a New York law firm that has among its clients Registered Organizations that need advice regarding compliance under New York’s CCA, would that lawyer be found inadmissible when applying for the H-1B visa at an overseas US Consulate? She should not, but if found inadmissible, this lawyer should forcefully make the case that her conduct would be found ethical pursuant to N.Y. State 1024, and thus should not be considered to be coming to the United States to engage in unlawful activity pursuant to INA 212(a)(3)(A)(ii). It is more likely that visa applicants will be denied entry if they are entering the United States to directly invest in a marijuana business, but probably less likely to be denied if they are performing activities that are more attenuated such as the New York lawyer advising compliance under the CCA or a computer professional who will be designing a social networking site for marijuana consumers. Just as some state bar ethics committees are finding ways to justify a lawyer’s conduct with respect to advising on marijuana activities deemed legal in many states, but illegal under federal law (although not always enforced if the state considers the activity legal), lawyers who represent visa applicants should also be advancing similar arguments with the immigration agencies. Until such time that there is a change in the federal law that legalizes marijuana activities, lawyers should be pushing the envelope on behalf of clients who seek visas relating to lawful marijuana-based activities in certain states, while at the same time strongly cautioning them of the risks of adverse immigration consequences. Finally, lawyers advising such clients must carefully consult with ethics opinions in their states to determine what they can and cannot do under Rule 1.2(d).

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